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Competing Competitions: Anticompetitive 
Conduct by Publisher-Controlled Esports 
Leagues 
Michael Arin  
  INTRODUCTION   
The esports1 industry is maturing; with maturation comes 
attention and regulation. At the same time, the esports industry 
debates player compensation2 in light of increased value of  
esports teams;3 professional player associations bargain for 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020 University of Minnesota Law School, Managing 
Editor, Minnesota Law Review, 2019–20. Student Editor-in-Chief, Esports Bar 
Association Journal, 2020. I would like to thank Susanna Blumenthal for her 
guidance during the note-writing process, as well as members of the Esports 
Bar Association for being a constant source of inspiration, discussion, and sup-
port. Of course, the Minnesota Law Review team also deserves high praise for 
the work they do. Copyright © 2020 by Michael Arin.  
 1. The term esports has not been defined by either the federal government 
or the states. Cf. Sports Wagering Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-10 (West 2018) 
(defining sports events as excluding “electronic sports”). As it will be used in 
this Note, it is often considered the “organized and competitive playing of video 
games.” Esports may fall into the definition of sports, which has many implica-
tions. See John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considera-
tions and Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46 (2017), for a def-
initional analysis and discussion of legal consequences of the classification 
thereof as “sport.” See also infra Part I.A (arguing the classification argument 
masks the complexity of issues in the antitrust context). 
 2. See Timothy Heggem, “It’s Complicated”: Analyzing the Potential for 
Esports Players’ Unions, 6 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 447 (2017); see also 
Hunter A. Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and Collec-
tive Bargaining Rights of Professional eSports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. 
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 359, 394–407 (2016) (discussing bargaining rights obtained 
by employee status). 
 3. See Christina Settimi, ‘Awful Business’ or the New Gold Rush? The Most 




1586 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1585 
 
standards and rights in their respective leagues;4 the Federal 
Trade Commission explores regulation of tech-dependent mar-
kets like esports5 and investigates loot boxes commonly sold by 
game publishers;6 Congress calls to reverse a politically-moti-
vated ban of a professional esports player;7 and antitrust ques-
 
[https://perma.cc/VFU6-KXVF]; see also Jurre Pannekeet, Newzoo: Global Es-
ports Economy Will Top $1 Billion for the First Time in 2019, NEWZOO (Feb. 12, 
2019), https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/newzoo-global-esports-economy-will 
-top-1-billion-for-the-first-time-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/9TPE-848S]. While 
many Newzoo statistics are now viewed as not credible, the one-billion-dollar 
estimate is incorporated by many as credible. See Cecilia D’Anastasio, Shady 
Numbers and Bad Business: Inside the Esports Bubble, KOTAKU (May 23, 2019), 
https://kotaku.com/as-esports-grows-experts-fear-its-a-bubble-ready-to-po 
-1834982843 [https://perma.cc/C3HK-JA2T]. 
 4. E.g., Devon Huge, The NA LCS Player’s Association Makes First Moves, 
ESPORTZ NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.esportznetwork.com/esports-the 
-nalcs-players-association-makes-first-moves [https://perma.cc/QQ6K-M3CK] 
(discussing the player’s association for professionals in Riot Games’s league for 
League of Legends). One of the first accomplishments of the NALCS Player’s 
Association was to negotiate for players to be able to stream on official tourna-
ment servers. Id.  Streaming means “any telecast, webcast, transmission, broad-
cast or distribution of video game content . . . to viewers not participating in the 
particular streamed game (whether on a live, delayed, recorded or on-demand 
basis) via any interface, channel, site, offering, network, application, device or 
other platform.” OVERWATCH LEAGUE, PLAYER STREAMING POLICY § 2; see also 
Streaming, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster 
.com/dictionary/streaming [https://perma.cc/JCT2-C8MB] (defining streaming 
as “the act, the process, or an instance of streaming data . . . or of accessing data 
that is being streamed”). While this is a far cry from the issues that plagued 
collective bargaining in traditional sports, it is a first and important step. 
 5. The FTC recently updated its intellectual property licensing guidelines 
in 2017. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LI-
CENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/UH4T-3KET]; see also Cecilia Kang, 
F.T.C. Hearings Add to Efforts that Threaten Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/technology/ftc-hearings 
-technology.html [https://perma.cc/M393-NUTE] (discussing antitrust reform in 
light of technological advancements). 
 6. On August 7, 2019, the Federal Trade Commission held a public work-
shop on “consumer protection issues related to video game loot boxes.” See gen-
erally FTC, Inside the Game: Unlocking the Consumer Issues Surrounding Loot 
Boxes (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/ 
1511966/slides-loot-box-8-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWF6-N4F9] (slides from 
panels). 
 7. Letter from the Congress of the United States to Robert Kotick, Chief 
Executive Officer, Activision Blizzard 1 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.wyden 
.senate.gov/download/101819-wyden-letter-to-activision-blizzard-re-hong-kong 
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tions loom large in the distance as esports experiment with or-
ganizing competitions.8 Publishers controlling major esports 
leagues modeled themselves after traditional sports leagues 
thereby drawing the natural analogy in the antitrust context. 
However, the existence of an intellectual rights-holder above 
all—the game publisher—means that esports do not map per-
fectly onto sports and the precedents cannot be neatly applied.9 
More specifically, largely ambiguous copyright protections af-
forded to game publishers garner significant attention, compli-
cate the antitrust analysis and generate substantial risk for  
investment in the nascent market.10 Highly-structured intellec-
tual property strategy allows the game publisher to exert deep 
downstream control over the esports market.11 Without atten-
tion and regulation, the publisher decides on the existence of the 
market, for the publisher as copyright holder over the game has 
exclusive control over the if, when, and how a game can be 
 
[https://perma.cc/2RQZ-JDYU]; see also infra Part II.B.2.a (arguing player bans 
for arbitrary or pretextual reasons, while permitted under copyright, may be 
used to reduce competition). 
 8. See, e.g., Laura L. Chao, “You Must Construct Additional Pylons”: 
Building a Better Framework for Esports Governance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 
746–49, 755–56 (2017) (raising concerns for anticompetitive conduct in esports 
based on mirroring of traditional sports); Max Miroff, Tiebreaker: An Antitrust 
Analysis of Esports, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 177 (2019) (analyzing tying 
claims against publisher-controlled leagues).  
 9. See infra Part I.B.  
 10. See FOLEY & LARDNER, 2018 ESPORTS SURVEY REPORT 6–9 (2018), 
https://www.foley.com/files/uploads/2018-Esports-Survey-Report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/3MPQ-8NVH] (identifying, inter alia, intellectual property 
rights and licensing issues as posing a substantial risk to the esports industry); 
Matt Morris et al., Ten Legal Issues To Watch When It Comes to Esports, FORBES 
(May 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allabouttherupees/2017/05/19/ten 
-legal-issues-to-watch-when-it-comes-to-esports/ [https://perma.cc/F75F 
-78MG]. Although the industry is still considered “nascent,” the year 2019 
marks the first time the global esports industry will be expected to surpass the 
billion-dollar revenue mark, with $409.1 million coming from North America 
alone. Pannekeet, supra note 3. 
 11. See Jochen Harttung, The Issue of “Deep Control” in Professional E-
sports—A Critical Analysis of Intellectual Property Structures in Electronic 
Gaming (2015) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Toronto), https:// 
tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/70431/1/Harttung_Jochen_201511_ 
LLM_thesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ5U-M9LX] (critiquing this deep control of 
downstream markets based on ambiguity of United States copyright jurispru-
dence).  
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streamed to others. The market is dependent upon a single actor: 
a potential monopolist.12  
Out of all the stakeholders in esports, independent tourna-
ment organizers are in the worst pinch.13 A case study of the 
2013 Evolution Championship Series (EVO) best illustrates the 
risks to such organizers. EVO represents the “largest and long-
est-running” fighting game tournament.14 Players pay an entry 
fee to compete in games such as Super Smash Bros. Melee, a Nin-
tendo fighting game, where contestants have the chance to win 
prize money and, more importantly, recognition in the fighting 
game community that could lead to sponsorship by a team or 
company.15 In return, the tournament organizers have the op-
portunity to sell tickets, attract advertisers, and monetize the 
end product: video game streams.16  
However, video game tournaments are effectively economic 
parasites, or symbionts, depending on the perspective. Without 
the publisher’s game, there would be no tournament, no profes-
sional player, and no advertising. Therefore, when users—pur-
chasers of the video game17—begin interacting with the intellec-
tual property beyond the intended use18 and create user-
 
 12. See generally Miroff, supra note 8 (determining that publishers repre-
sent potential monopolists of the esports market or the individual-game mar-
kets).  
 13. The independent organizer is highlighted as opposed to the game pub-
lisher organizer because, as explained in Part II, the copyright most likely falls 
to the game publisher absent congressional, judicial, or contractual interven-
tion. 
 14. EVO CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://evo.shoryuken.com [https://perma 
.cc/S98A-VAF6]. 
 15. See Tournament Format, EVO CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, http://evo 
.shoryuken.com/tournament-format [https://perma.cc/3FUV-FMWW]. 
 16. An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, ESPORTS OBSERVER, https:// 
esportsobserver.com/the-esports-eco-system [https://perma.cc/C25R-8SVG]. 
 17. Video games are no longer solely products. John Breyault, Nat’l Con-
sumers League, Making Money from GaaS: Consumer Protection in an Evolving 
Video Game Industry, in Inside the Game, supra note 6, at 57–73. The greater 
software-as-a-service phenomenon has gripped the video game industry forcing 
publishers to commit significant resources to the maintenance of the original 
product. See Sean F. Kane, Treasure or Trifle? A Macro Look at Microtransac-
tions, in INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 6, at 2, 5–13. But it also allows the pub-
lishers to benefit from the longer lifespan through drip pricing (e.g., microtrans-
actions) and organized competitive play. Breyault, supra note 17,  at 61–63.  
 18. But see Andrew Webster, Why Competitive Gaming Is Starting To Look 
a Lot Like Professional Sports, VERGE (July 27, 2018), https://www.theverge 
.com/2018/7/27/17616532/overwatch-league-of-legends-nba-nfl-esports [https:// 
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generated content19 such as memes20 or streams,21 friction 
sparks battle over ownership.22  
In 2013, that friction led Nintendo to exercise its copyright 
protections, call up the EVO organizers, and demand that the 
tournament pull Super Smash Bros. Melee entirely.23 The organ-
izers managed to negotiate that the game would be played, but 
not broadcasted.24 But, when the announcement led to public 
outcry, Nintendo ultimately relented and permitted the broad-
cast.25 As this situation illustrates, without such good-will ar-
rangements or the current industry self-regulation favoring con-
tractual symbiosis,26 tournament organizers are left exposed to 
 
perma.cc/MB6F-93BH] (indicating that game publishers intended such compet-
itive use). 
 19. See T.L. TAYLOR, WATCH ME PLAY: TWITCH AND THE RISE OF GAME 
LIVE STREAMING 10 (2018) (describing user-generated content as the “inter-
weaving of original creative material with existing intellectual property”). 
 20. A meme is defined as “an idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads 
from person to person within a culture” or “an amusing or interesting item (such 
as a captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread widely online 
especially through social media.” Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme [https://perma.cc/KR6Q 
-GVVR]. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 
331 (2005) (discussing copyright implications of memes). 
 21. See supra note 4 (defining streaming). 
 22. Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 21–22, 212–18 (describing the tension be-
tween cultural innovation and existing legal frameworks).  
 23. Jenna Pitcher, Nintendo Wanted To Shut Down Super Smash Bros. Me-
lee Evo Event, Not Just Stream, POLYGON (July 11, 2013), https://www 
.polygon.com/2013/7/11/4513294/nintendo-were-trying-to-shut-down-evo-not 
-just-super-smash-bros-melee [https://perma.cc/27ZJ-HYK6]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Steven Bogos, Nintendo Will Officially Sponsor the Next EVO Fighting 
Tournament, ESCAPIST (July 6, 2014), https://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/ 
view/135927-Nintendo-Will-Officially-Sponsor-The-Next-EVO-Fighting 
-Tournament [https://perma.cc/NW23-DUN2]. 
 26. See, e.g., Dota 2 Tournament License and Paid Spectator Service Agree-
ment, VALVE CORP., cdn.dota2.com/apps/dota2/leagues/league_terms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SXH8-UGXT] (setting forth a contractual arrangement be-
tween independent tournament organizers and the game publisher). While 
Valve is not unique in providing a Tournament License, the competitive scene 
around Valve’s products, namely Dota 2, does not conform to the traditional 
league structure. Cf. Vlad Savov, Dota 2 Is the World’s Richest E-Sport, So Why 
Aren’t Its Players Happy?, VERGE (May 13, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2015/5/13/8597121/dota-2-professional-gaming-tournaments-the-international 
[https://perma.cc/VU9K-PQMZ] (noting how Valve is unique for having “laissez-
faire principles” that have resulted in the “fragmentation of its self-organizing 
competitive scene”). Valve has provided some structure with the major/minor 
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high liability should any game publisher enforce its copyright 
protections. Coupled with the growing trend of publisher-con-
trolled leagues27 wherein the entity that holds the rights to the 
game also partakes in the monetization of the competitive scene, 
circumstances like this raise alarming concerns over anticom-
petitive practices and threatened monopolization. With a series 
of DMCA28 takedown notices, player bans, or license revocations, 
the game publisher could defeat any competing leagues thereby 
gaining a monopoly over their title’s viewership. 
This Note highlights the problematic rise of publisher-con-
trolled leagues that can manipulate deep control29 over video 
game copyright protections to engage in anticompetitive prac-
tices seen in traditional sports leagues. Part I begins by discuss-
ing the concept of “sportsification”—the application of sports eco-
nomics to video games so as to produce a competitive scene. This 
leads to a discussion, first, of the video games and underlying 
copyright protections afforded to game publishers and the limits 
on licensing these rights. Next, it details the economic structure 
of traditional sports markets, antitrust law’s rocky history with 
sports, and a critique of the competitive balance argument. Fi-
nally, Part I explains esports (the mix of video games and 
sports), recognizes the antitrust questions left unexplored, and 
focuses on the problem of publisher-controlled leagues.  
Part II then identifies the problem in copyright law wherein 
limits to licensing are recognized but ill-defined, thereby allow-
ing publishers to experiment with control over downstream mar-
kets. It then delineates (relatively) bright-line antitrust prob-
lems found in traditional sports history and pairs them to 
 
system, but this deviates from the single-tournament structure championed by 
traditional sports like basketball, football, and baseball. 
 27. The publisher may not be the actual league operator. Generally, an en-
tity separate from the publisher operates the league; however, the two appear 
to be integrated in fact. See Bayliss, supra note 2, at 364 (discussing the ques-
tionable separation between Riot Games, the publisher of League of Legends, 
and the North American League of Legends Championship Series, the league 
operator).  
 28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 29. Harttung, supra note 11, at 46, uses the term “deep control” to describe 
the game publisher’s control over other stakeholders in the downstream esports 
market such as tournament organizers, teams, and players. Because it reso-
nates in the intellectual property and antitrust contexts, it will be used through-
out this Note to refer to the same concept. 
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traditional licensing arrangements in order to show that the eco-
nomic practices by publisher-controlled leagues are paradoxi-
cally legitimate exercises of copyright and unreasonable re-
straints on sports competition. Part II focuses on four practices: 
controlling pool of potential players through bans, territorial al-
location through field of use restrictions, restricting supply of es-
ports content through pooled broadcasting rights, and restricting 
supply of esports content to consumers through pure exclusivity 
and refusal to deal. In the end, this paradox leaves a fragile sta-
tus quo reliant on the shaky system of publisher-regulation 
while the market grows.  
Finally, Part III proposes a statutory solution based, in part, 
on the Music Modernization Act (MMA).30 After discussing why 
online music streaming serves as an imperfect model for a solu-
tion to publisher-controlled leagues, Part III begins to outline 
the necessary elements of a so-called Esports Competition Mod-
ernization Act. In order to run a tournament, the game publish-
ers would opt-in to a compulsory licensing scheme upon registra-
tion of the work with the Copyright Office. Upon opting-in, any 
tournament organizer could benefit from the irrevocable statu-
tory license for competitive play, so long as they abide by the 
conditions set forth therein, including payment to the publisher 
of a royalty based on tournament revenue. A minimally-invasive 
rate setting board would facilitate collection and distribution of 
royalties between publishers and independent tournament or-
ganizers. In essence, this system ensures that a publisher may 
only have a league or operate a tournament on the same playing 
field as independent operators—competing competitions. And, in 
the end, the competing competitions solution serves as a better 
alternative to regulatory oversight, changes to copyright law, or 
reliance on antitrust law, each of which suffer from critical flaws. 
I.  ESPORTS: SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT   
Part I will discuss the three foundational pillars of esports 
antitrust concerns arising from the surge in publisher-controlled 
leagues: video games as copyright-protected entertainment, 
league structures as the keystone of sports economics, and es-
ports—the market around the competitive playing of video 
 
 30. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 
115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. 
(2018)). 
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games. The pillars stem from the central debate in esports aca-
demic literature: the classification of esports as sports or enter-
tainment.31 This Note recognizes the importance of the distinc-
tion but favors the concept of sportsification—the application of 
sports economics to video games. To be more exact, publishers 
are able to use their intellectual property rights over their video 
games to control a league and reproduce even anticompetitive 
sports practices. 
Video games form the core of the esports industry, and the 
second portion of Part I outlines the copyright protections over 
video games. First, ambiguous copyright protections afforded to 
game publishers lead to deep and downstream control over other 
stakeholders in esports.32 While antitrust law places theoretical 
limits on uses of copyright rights, those limits are relatively un-
explored by the courts. Instead, creative licensing strategies al-
low the publisher to significantly manipulate the market and po-
tential competitors.33 Some markets, such as music, have found 
solutions to antitrust concerns with intellectual property licens-
ing through compulsory licensing schemes.34  
Esports used traditional sports as a model to monetize on 
the competitive play of those copyright-protected video games. 
The third portion of Part I tracks the economic structure of 
sports,35 the antitrust concerns from the 1950s onwards,36 and 
antitrust law’s unspoken assumption that competitive balance is 
achieved by a single championship.37 The mirrored business 
models of sports and esports largely grounded in self-regulation 
lead to the same economic concerns highlighted in the 1950s 
Congressional hearings on monopolistic tendencies in sports and 
after: regional monopolies, bottlenecking players from entering 
competing leagues, pooled broadcast rights, and pure exclusiv-
ity.  
 
 31. See infra Part I.A. 
 32. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 33. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 35. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 36. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 37. See infra Part I.C.3. 
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Finally, the fourth portion of Part I explains the current eco-
nomic practices in the esports industry, the different stakehold-
ers, and the growing concern for anticompetitive conduct.38 In 
particular, this Note focuses on the economic practices giving 
rise to antitrust concerns in the sports context.39 In the end, 
many questions about the application of antitrust to esports are 
left as unexplored territory.40 Max Miroff and, to a lesser extent, 
Laura Chao have addressed antitrust in esports, but this Note is 
the first to tie together esports intellectual property concerns re-
sulting from publisher-controlled leagues to readily-identifiable 
anticompetitive sports economics.41  
A. ESPORTS: SPORTS OR ENTERTAINMENT? 
Esports is the competitive playing of video games.42 The evo-
lution of esports is relatively short but spans the history of video 
games. The first organized competitive playing of video games 
occurred via arcade machines during the 1970s and 1980s.43 
During that time, competition took place through high scores, 
though a few games, such as Pong,44 introduced concurrent com-
petitive play.45 Yet play was localized and competition was in-
herently limited to those physically present.46 The second wave 
of esports, spanning from the 1990s to 2010, crystalized as the 
cost of bandwidth went down, thereby allowing players to con-
nect online.47 During this time, games like StarCraft (1998), 
 
 38. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 39. There are other antitrust concerns with player unionization. See, e.g., 
Harris Peskin, Unionization in Esports, ESPORTS B. ASS’N J., Oct. 2019, https:// 
esportsbar.org/journals/2019/9/11/unionization-in-esports [https://perma.cc/ 
D48A-RWYS] (discussing antitrust concerns with mandatory salary caps and 
collective bargaining). 
 40. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 41. See infra Part I.D.3. 
 42. Holden et al., supra note 1, at 47–48.  
 43. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4. 
 44. Pong is a game where players control a paddle guarding a goalpost. 
Atari PONG, CTR. FOR COMPUTING HIST., http://www.computinghistory.org.uk/ 
det/4007/Atari-PONG/ [https://perma.cc/HPX2-5EBP]. A ball bounces around 
the screen and the player tries to get the ball into the opposing player’s goalpost. 
Id. 
 45. See T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: E-SPORTS AND THE PROFESSION-
ALIZATION OF COMPUTER GAMING 184 (2012). 
 46. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4. 
 47. See id.; Dean Takahashi, Team Liquid’s Steve Arhancet Tells Us How 
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Counter Strike (2000), and Defense of the Ancients (DOTA) 
(2003)48 invited players to compete against other human players 
repeatedly and consistency of performance began to matter.49 
However, latency issues with online connectivity forced compet-
itive play to remain relatively localized at Local Area Network 
(LAN) tournaments.50 With early adopters of the Internet often 
attending these LAN events, networking nevertheless allowed 
for the formation of a true esports industry largely modeled after 
traditional sports.51 But it was Twitch52 that unshackled esports 
from its locality in 2011 and made esports truly a global phenom-
enon.53 Twitch is a live streaming site that serves as a platform 
for esports: the world can tune in instantly.54 The growth of live 
streaming transformed esports from merely competitive play—
 
To Run an Esports Team, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 28, 2017), https://venturebeat 
.com/2017/04/28/team-liquids-steve-arhancet-tells-us-how-to-run-an-esports 
-team/ [https://perma.cc/6XRT-JQYN]. 
 48. Games such as Pong are limited in connectivity. See Atari PONG, supra 
note 44. The second wave introduced concurrent and competitive online play 
where success was not found in beating a computer but in beating another per-
son or even another team. See Takahashi, supra note 47. 
 49. See generally ROLAND LI, GOOD LUCK HAVE FUN: THE RISE OF ESPORTS 
(2016) (discussing the evolution of competitive playing of videogames). 
 50. LAN tournaments are those which operate on a single localized network 
spanning no more than a couple buildings and most often confined to a single 
room. See Local Area Network, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www 
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/local%20area%20network [https://perma.cc/ 
KBW5-XSY8]. 
 51. Traditional sports shall be used to refer to baseball, football, and bas-
ketball collectively. While others, such as soccer, should fall well within the def-
inition, these sports stand apart because of congressional and judicial scrutiny. 
See e.g., Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (applying to “orga-
nized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, [and] hockey,” 
but not soccer). 
 52. Twitch.tv is an online streaming platform designed with esports in 
mind. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 3–4. Users can broadcast their play online 
directly to other users who can interact and comment in the chat. Id. Most es-
ports tournaments are broadcast through Twitch today, though some companies 
such as Valve (Steam.tv), Microsoft (Mixer), and even Facebook (Facebook Gam-
ing) are attempting to take a slice of the pie. See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, Facebook 
Challenges Twitch with Exclusive Esports Streaming Deal, TECHRADAR (Jan. 
23, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/facebook-challenges-twitch-with 
-exclusive-esports-streaming-deal [https://perma.cc/5AGD-KS4K].  
 53. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4. 
 54. Id. at 3–4. 
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as T.L. Taylor puts it, a “sports product”—into media entertain-
ment,55 from a niche and ancillary market to a motive for video 
game creation.56  
But therein lies the question: are esports sports or enter-
tainment? The rise of esports triggered a vigorous debate over 
whether these games should legally be considered sports and ce-
mented the comparison as the starting point of all analysis.57 On 
the one hand, esports is entertainment. Esports rely on media 
rights to monetize,58 depend on online consumer spectatorship 
compared to in-person attendance,59 and stem from video games 
that were, at one point, only considered entertainment.60 On the 
other hand, esports are modeled after sports. Even if society may 
reject esports as sport,61 the leagues have the same economic 
stakeholders one would find in a sports league.62  
Maybe more importantly, the distinction is relevant legally. 
Sports are treated differently at the federal and state levels. For 
example, in gaming law the Professional and Amateur Sports 
 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. Consider the string of games since 2016 that have branded themselves, 
from the very release, as esports titles: Overwatch (2016), Fortnite (2017), and 
PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (PUBG) (2017). See Webster, supra note 18 (“It 
was a unique opportunity in that it was Blizzard’s first new [intellectual prop-
erty] in 17 years, and so we were building this new IP, this new game franchise. 
It was an opportunity to build something from the beginning of the game’s 
lifecycle. . . . [W]e thought, well, ‘How do we build the entire ecosystem around 
competitive Overwatch?’”). 
 57. See generally Holden et al., supra note 1 (discussing the classification 
of esports as sports). 
 58. See infra Parts I.B., I.D. 
 59. Robert Elder, The Esports Audience Is Escalating Quickly, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-esports-audience 
-is-escalating-quickly-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/7SD6-WPL7] (comparing 
173,000 in-person attendees to 46 million unique viewers online). Of course, 
sports also rely on broadcasting, which is closer to the esports viewership expe-
rience. 
 60. See supra notes 42–56 (discussing the evolution of esports); infra Part 
I.B; see also Gary Larson, The Far Side: Hopeful Parents, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 
1990, at B12 (depicting two parents imagining a future where their son can 
make money from his video game hobby). 
 61. For most people, there is not the same physical element—gross motor 
skills such as running, lifting, or throwing. See generally Holden et al., supra 
note 1 (discussing the physical activity involved in esports). 
 62. See also infra Part I.D.1. 
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Protection Act once regulated sports betting;63 now states have 
taken up this mantle.64 The Wire Act exempts sporting events or 
contests from its prohibition on wagering.65 In terms of educa-
tion, integrating esports into existing collegiate sports has impli-
cations for Title IX balance in colleges.66 Some sports have even 
received antitrust exemptions in regards to pooled broadcasting 
rights.67 Finally, courts and regulators looking at the esports in-
dustry will analogize to the sports and entertainment industries 
in the antitrust context.68 Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
the entertainment (intellectual property) and sports antitrust 
jurisprudence surrounding each. 
B. ENTERTAINMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS 
OF VIDEO GAMES 
If esports have modeled themselves after traditional sports 
economics, the defining quality distinguishing the two is the in-
tellectual property rights held by the game publisher.69 Put an-
other way: no one owns the game of football, but someone owns 
games like Overwatch.70 The National Football League lacks the 
capacity, both legally and physically, to stop or otherwise place 
conditions on every group that would like to play football, rang-
ing from recognized state high school conferences to a collection 
of neighborhood kids playing a pickup game. But Blizzard is le-
gally well within its rights to prevent players or entire leagues 
from playing Overwatch, and Blizzard can effectively enforce 
those bans with just the click of a mouse. This Part first looks to 
United States copyright law that has evolved to protect creative 
works like video games.71 Then, it will be shown that the courts 
 
 63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Murphy v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 64. E.g., Sports Wagering Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-10 to -19 (West 
2018) (defining sports events as excluding “electronic sports”). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2012) (criminalizing 
“bribery in sporting contests”).  
 66. See Holden et al., supra note 1, at 56–59. 
 67. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 68. See, e.g., Miroff, supra note 8. 
 69. Id. at 179–80. 
 70. Id. Activision Blizzard is the publisher of Overwatch, a team-based 
first-person shooter. About, ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, https://overwatchleague 
.com/en-us/about [https://perma.cc/9GTJ-9AL4]. 
 71. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2018) (codifying copyright laws in 
the United States).  
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have failed to examine the exact protections available to video 
game rights holders, thereby leaving the industry to play at the 
fringes through self-regulation. Strategic licensing agreements 
take advantage of this ambiguity progress game publisher con-
trol, possibly in excess of actual rights. Finally, this Part high-
lights the limitations on intellectual property licensing set forth 
by courts and the black letter law, including antitrust concerns 
and compulsory licensing schema. 
1. Copyright Protections of Video Games: Protection, 
Exclusive Rights, and Licensing 
The game publisher creates a video game, sometimes with 
the monetization of interactive entertainment in mind; to 
achieve this, the publisher sells or licenses intellectual property 
rights.72 The assets produced through the game creation process 
can be protected through patents (e.g. systems or overlays for 
spectatorship73), trademarks (e.g. game names or iconic 
phrases), and trade secrets (e.g. game balance process74). How-
ever, in the end, video games are largely protected via copy-
right.75 Copyrightable materials are “original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”76 They do not 
include any “idea, procedure, process, system, methods of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery.”77 Although video games 
 
 72. See supra note 56. Miroff, supra note 8, at 215, generally disagrees with 
the development-incentivization argument, citing the disproportionate revenue 
generated from esports relative to game sales. However, even if it is a secondary 
consideration, copyright law seeks to promote that innovation. U.S. CONST. art. 
1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 73. E.g., Video Game System with Spectator Mode HUD, U.S. Patent No. 
9,878,252 (filed July 26, 2016). This patent is for an overlay that is used to en-
hance the viewership experience of online spectators for the game of League of 
Legends. Id. 
 74. The process behind making changes to the game is a highly guarded 
secret of each publisher. See Kyle E. Conklin, Trade Secrets in the Video Game 
Industry, OBER|KALER: IP WATCH (May 22, 2009), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/trade-secrets-in-the-video-game-industry-44015/ [https://perma.cc/ 
S8M6-8PY7]. Finding game balance that keeps players playing and viewers in-
terested is the key to selling the game and its related esports content.  
 75. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2012); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 
F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
 77. Id. § 102(b).  
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are not listed among the eight categories of works under 17 
U.S.C. § 102, courts have interpreted “literary works” to include 
the underlying computer code and “motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works”78 to protect the audiovisual content of video 
games.79  
Copyright attaches at the fixation of the work. A work is 
fixed when “its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion.”80 Courts recognize fixation of the audiovisual work when 
the game is permanently embodied in memory devices from 
which they can be perceived with the aid of the other components 
of the game—i.e., the console and television.81  
Once attached, copyright protects the game’s “story, charac-
ters, imagined environments and geographic locations, music, 
graphics . . . [and] the entire game.”82 Courts have also inter-
preted the copyright to extend to every single iteration of the 
gameplay while recognizing that.83 Arguably, because the game 
publisher has intellectual property rights over every possible it-
eration of gameplay, those rights equally extend to online per-
formance of the games through streaming, despite any interac-
tivity by the player.84 
 
 78. See, e.g., League of Legends, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright 
.gov/ (follow “Search Copyright Records” hyperlink; then search “League of Leg-
ends” in Basic Search; select copyright number PA0002065995) [https://perma 
.cc/L4SY-JCP8] (showing copyright for the game League of Legends filed, most 
recently, under “motion picture”).  
 79. Kyle Coogan, Let’s Play: A Walkthrough of Quarter-Century-Old Copy-
right Precedent as Applied to Modern Video Games, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 385–86 (2018).  
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 81. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d. Cir. 1982).  
 82. S. GREGORY BOYD ET AL., VIDEO GAME LAW 21 (2019). 
 83. Midway Mfg. Co., v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“The question is whether the creative effort in playing a video game is enough 
like writing or painting to make each performance of a video game the work of 
the player and not the game’s inventor. We think it is not.”). But see Ryan 
Fairchild, Thirty-Five Years Without Player Rights in Gameplay, ESPORTS B. 
ASS’N J., Oct. 2019, https://esportsbar.org/journals/2019/9/11/player-rights-in-
gameplay [https://perma.cc/MF99-624B] (arguing that the interactivity argu-
ment is becoming more convincing). 
 84. See generally Elizabeth Brusa, Comment, Professional Video Gaming: 
Piracy that Pays, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 217 (2015) (analyzing the potentially 
infringing content of real-time streaming, archived video, tutorials, and walk-
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The exclusive rights of a copyright owner are enumerated in 
17 U.S.C. § 106. Particular to the esports context are the rights 
of reproduction,85 derivative works,86 and public performance.87 
Reproduction rights protect against exact or substantial copy-
ing.88 Derivative works are those “based upon one or more preex-
isting works, such as a . . . motion picture version, . . . art repro-
duction, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted.”89 Common derivative works include 
translations, motion picture adaptations of literary materials, 
and new software versions of an existing computer program.90 
An author of a derivative work gains copyrights in the enhance-
ment or additions only, provided that the author of the preexist-
ing work duly authorized the author.91 Finally, the right to per-
form publicly is to “recite, render, play, dance, or act [a 
work] . . . or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to show its images in any sequence” at “a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons 
outside of a normal circle of a family . . . is gathered.”92 These 
exclusive rights are turned into a final product in the esports 
market—video game live-play or streams. The author may ex-
clude all others from capitalizing on these rights; exclusivity is 
the copyright owner’s greatest advantage.  
One means of enforcing exclusivity is through the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)93 takedown procedure. On 
 
throughs of video gameplay). See also infra Part II.B, for an examination of the 
control exercised by publisher-controlled leagues. 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 86. Id. § 106(2). 
 87. Id. § 106(4). 
 88. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 
F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982), superseded by statute on other grounds, FED. 
R. CIV. P. 52(a) (clarifying that courts should apply the “clearly erroneous” test 
in reviewing findings of fact by the court). 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 90. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 14: COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE 
WORKS AND COMPILATIONS 1 (2013). 
 91. Id. at 2.  
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Red Baron-Franlkin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 
F.2d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that playing a pay-for-play arcade 
machine constitutes a public performance); Valve Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t, 431 F. 
Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (W.D. Wash 2004) (extending Red Baron to playing a game 
at a cyber-café). 
 93. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2018)). 
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the one hand, the DMCA provides a safe harbor for online service 
providers (e.g. Twitch) in the event users upload infringing con-
tent.94 On the other hand, online service providers are obligated 
to take down content upon receiving a notice of infringement—
the online equivalent of a cease-and-desist—from the rights 
holder.95 In the video game context, publishers have issued 
DMCA takedown notices in response to online videos when users 
fail to obtain a license.96 This is an important defensive mecha-
nism available to publishers to enforce their copyright exclusiv-
ity.  
Copyright holders can also engage in various forms of strat-
egy other than enforcing the exclusivity of their rights. The 
rights holder has the ability to sell the property, license the prop-
erty, collaborate with competitors and customers to enhance the 
property, or even give it away.97 Licensing property includes di-
viding up the intellectual property by right (only authorizing the 
making of derivative works, but not the performance thereof) or 
by field of use restrictions (limiting geography, use, product, 
etc.).98 Through careful licensing, publishers can sell individual 
or grouped parts of the copyright, like separating the rights to 
make a movie and the rights to make a comic book based on the 
video game world and characters. In fact, through strategic li-
censing, the possibilities are nearly limitless. 
2. Lacking Limitations to Video Game Licensing 
What is less clear is what copyright holders cannot do.99 
Video game publishers cannot control their intellectual property 
 
 94. Id. § 512(c).  
 95. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).  
 96. E.g., Dan Hagen, Fair Use, Fair Play: Video Game Performances and 
“Let’s Plays” as Transformative Use, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245, 253–54, 
257–58 (2018) (describing takedown notices, particularly those issued by Nin-
tendo against the EVO Fighting Games Championships and Let’s Plays on 
YouTube).  
 97. William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management 
of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157, 159–
68 (2013).  
 98. Tyler Maddry, The Shifting Subject Matter of IP Licensing, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING 
TRENDS IN IP LICENSING AND DRAFTING EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS 10–12 (2016). 
 99. But see Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 
1283, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Copyright protection does not accord a copyright 
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in four relevant instances: other copyrights, fair use, copyright 
misuse, and compulsory licenses. Most of these limitations are 
ill defined and provide little assistance in determining legitimate 
boundaries of a publisher’s control over its intellectual assets.  
First, video game publishers cannot control the copyrights 
of others. The courts in the 1980s faced the argument that play-
ers should receive copyright over their individual performances 
of the game.100 This independent interactivity argument best 
presented in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, 
Inc.101 is seeing a resurgence in light of complex gameplay by the 
players.102 Players increasingly contribute to the outcome of the 
game—including possibly exceeding intended game play, e.g., 
exploitation of bugs—and that original and fixed performance 
 
owner complete control over all possible uses of the protected work.”), aff’d, 704 
F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1992)  
 100. Atari Games Corp v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (revers-
ing denial of copyright registration by author of game when Register of Copy-
rights erroneously said that the audiovisual elements are “created randomly by 
the player and not by the author of the video game”); Midway Mfg. Co., v. Artic 
Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); see 
also Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). In 
essence, the interactivity argument suggests that people, in playing the video 
game, control the sequence of images on the screen in such a way that their 
original and fixed performance is the first fixation and should, at the very least, 
merit copyright protection as a co-author of the performance. Williams Electron-
ics, 685 F.2d at 874. The argument was rejected because  
[p]laying a video game is more like changing channels on a television 
than it is like writing a novel or painting a picture . . . [the player] can-
not create any sequence he wants out of the images stored on the 
game’s circuit boards. The most he can do is choose one of the limited 
number of sequences the game allows him to choose. 
Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1012. While this may have been true for the game 
at issue, Pac-Man, this is less true for popular games today like Fortnite or 
Minecraft. 
 101. Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d 1009. 
 102. Tori Allen, Note, What’s in a Game: Collective Management Organiza-
tions and Video Game Copyright, 8 U. NEV. L.V. GAMING L.J. 209, 215 (2018) 
(arguing that user-generated content could result in copyrightable works); 
Fairchild, supra note 83 (“While courts to date have effectively held that video 
game players have no copyrights in their gameplay, those decisions derive from 
games like Pac-Man and Galaxian, which bear little resemblance to contempo-
rary games. With the rise of increasing video game complexity, more sophisti-
cated play, and new judicial tests involving copyrights in software output, a le-
gal window may be opening for a player or influencer to challenge old 
precedent.”). 
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may result in copyrights, either as independent works, co-au-
thored works or authorized derivative works.103 However, such 
arguments have consistently been rejected. 
Second, video game publishers cannot control fair use of the 
intellectual property. Designed to encourage creative activity for 
the public good, fair use is a defense to infringement of copyright 
that excuses particular conduct, such as criticism, comment, and 
teaching, or conduct passing muster after an analysis of the pur-
pose of the use, the nature of the work, the amount used, and the 
effect of the use on the market.104 This argument suggests that 
players contribute significant creative effort in the creation of 
the esports content so as to transform the game during the 
stream to such a high degree that it no longer qualifies as in-
fringing.105 But there do not appear to be any cases claiming to 
extend fair use to any play. 
Next, antitrust—through the doctrine of copyright misuse—
provides a third limitation. Despite the seeming paradox of ex-
clusivity and antitrust law’s promotion of competition, the two 
laws “are complementary efforts to promote an efficient market-
place and long-run, dynamic competition through innovation.”106 
 
 103. Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Com-
puter Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1548–50 (2013) (raising possibility of 
independent copyrights based on increased interactivity, expressing skepticism 
towards any intent to create a joint work, and finding the play by players to 
constitute an authorized derivative work as most plausible); Allen, supra note 
102, at 218. 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); Allen v. Acad. Games League of Am., 89 F.3d 
614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying in dicta that “[e]ven if the playing of a board 
game could be classified as public performance under copyright law, the ‘perfor-
mance’ of the games by tournament organizers would constitute fair use”); Valve 
Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (W.D. Wash 2004) (declining 
to extend Academic Games to games at a cyber-café); Hagen, supra note 96. 
 105. Hagen, supra note 96, at 265–71 (arguing that Let’s Plays—a “recording 
of gameplay footage made for the benefit of an audience”—are fair use of a game 
publisher’s copyright); Jihan Joo, Note, Public Video Gaming as Copyright In-
fringement, 39 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 563, 601 (2011) (arguing compet-
itive and communal video gaming are fair use of a game publisher’s copyright).  
 106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF AN-
TITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1–14 (3d ed. 
2018) (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990)). 
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Copyright misuse, borrowed from the doctrine of patent mis-
use,107 is a defense to infringement claiming that the copyright 
holder has exceeded the monopoly provided by the copyright.108 
If the “copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public 
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright,” then the holder may 
be estopped from claiming infringement.109 This does not neces-
sarily mean that the copyright is used in violation of the anti-
trust laws—the doctrine extends beyond that—but violations of 
antitrust are likely examples of misuse.110 Regardless, the am-
biguous language of “violative of the public policy” has not been 
well-clarified by the courts and provides little guidance for copy-
right holders.111  
Finally, certain industries, like music, have responded to li-
censing difficulties through statutes imposing compulsory li-
censing.112 Music, like video games, is equally protected by cop-
yright.113 It is complex and involves a number of different 
 
 107. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(finding a defense of copyright misuse predicated upon the defense of patent 
misuse). Unlike patent misuse, copyright misuse did not find much success in 
the courts. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of 
Copyright: Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 565, 579 
(2006) (finding only three successful defenses out of the thirty-two attempts be-
tween 1990 and 2006). 
 108. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. Patent misuse stemmed from concerns that 
patents would be used to restrain competition for items not covered by the pa-
tent. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491–93 (1942), abro-
gated in part by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (hold-
ing that the mere fact that a product is patented does not support a presumption 
of market power). Four circuits extended the same logic to copyrights by recog-
nizing the limitation to copyright use contrary to the public policy of the original 
grant in U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8: to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” See also Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 342 F.3d 191, 
2014 (3d Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th 
Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975. 
 109. Ekstrand, supra note 107, at 575 (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc., 911 
F.2d at 970). 
 110. Id.  
 111. See also Thomas Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 925–32 (2007) 
(analyzing inconsistent standards for copyright misuse). 
 112. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73A: COMPULSORY LI-
CENSING FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS (2019), https://www 
.copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB28-NALM] (outlining the 
compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords in 17 U.S.C. § 115 
(2018)).  
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).  
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licenses including composition (whose author is the composer, 
but whose owner may be the publisher) and sound recording 
(whose author is the performer) licenses.114 When streaming ser-
vices like Spotify and Apple Music want to purchase these li-
censes en masse, the streaming service first negotiates for the 
performance rights of the composition with performance rights 
organizations115 before negotiating rates with record labels (pub-
lishers) for the sound recording license.116 These groups can al-
ways decline to license the rights. In contrast, the streaming ser-
vice can automatically get a license to the reproduction of the 
composition of the song via Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 
1976, provided that the streaming service follows the conditions 
thereof, i.e., pays a royalty rate set by statute.117 These compul-
sory licenses were also modified and facilitated by the Music 
Modernization Act. A compulsory license is a significant limita-
tion to the rights holder’s control over the use of its intellectual 
property, but the blunt tool of compulsory licenses are not used 
in the law often. 
C. SPORTS: LEAGUE STRUCTURES AND ANTICOMPETITIVE 
ECONOMICS 
To learn how to monetize the copyright rights in a competi-
tive context, esports game publishers looked to traditional 
sports. This Section first identifies the parties necessary to cre-
ate the sports league whose goal is to deliver the end product of 
 
 114. Sarah Jeong, A $1.6 Billion Spotify Lawsuit Is Based on a Law Made 
for Player Pianos, VERGE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/ 
14/17117160/spotify-mechanical-license-copyright-wixen-explainer [https:// 
perma.cc/X3ES-UGNX].  
 115. Performers naturally have an incentive to come together to sell a better-
bundled product—a pooled license to hundreds of songs by different artists. 
However, pooled licensing agreements have frequently been challenged in the 
courts due to their anticompetitive nature. E.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1979); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 
F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (regarding pooled copyrighted music); see also 
infra Part I.C.2 (discussing pooled licensing arrangements in sports). While the 
complex antitrust exceptions and regulatory regime for music are beyond the 
scope of this Note, they nevertheless cloud any attempt to borrow ideas from the 
music industry.  
 116. Michelle Castillo, Spotify IPO Filing Reveals How Insanely Complicated 
It Is To License Music Rights, CNBC: TECH DRIVERS (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/how-spotify-licenses-and-pays-for-music 
-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8FV5-SWN6].  
 117. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c). 
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competition amongst the teams. Next, this Section looks at how 
the collaboration among competitors in these joint ventures nat-
urally triggers antitrust concerns. However, sports ventures 
have justified anticompetitive conduct based on the practice’s 
benefit to competitive balance. In the end, sports antitrust juris-
prudence identifies anticompetitive practices, but often rational-
izes them under a critiquable competitive balance argument.  
1. Structures of Sports and Esports Leagues  
To best understand the current economic circumstances of 
the esports industry, it is important to first discuss the economic 
structure of traditional sports leagues. In order for the market 
for competitive sports to exist, there must be some form of coop-
eration between two entities (teams).118 When teams come to-
gether to play, they are in the unique position of cooperative com-
petitors. In the antitrust context, the entity they create is known 
as a joint venture.119 The joint venture is not inherently a sepa-
rate firm, but an agreement to operate and decide cooperative 
policy in tandem.  
Teams in the league must band together to decide crucial 
common policy such as the format or method for scheduling 
matches to determine the champion, the vertical relationships of 
the league to other leagues (i.e., professional to amateur), the 
horizontal relationships of the league to other leagues (i.e., pro-
fessional to professional), the conditions of entry and exit (i.e., 
membership, the geographic distribution thereof, and whether 
its member are subject to relegation and promotion), the meth-
ods for deciding and enforcing league rules and policies (e.g., ar-
bitrability), as well as many other joint economic decisions.120 
The teams must coordinate to produce competitive balance, a de-
gree of uncertainty of outcome in the game, lest all viewers lose 
interest because the league becomes predictable.121 Teams also 
 
 118. Stefan Késenne, The Optimal Competitive Balance in a Sports League?, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE SPORTS 85 (Rodríguez et al. eds., 2015). 
 119. See Salil K. Mehra & T. Joel Zuercher, Striking Out “Competitive Bal-
ance” in Sports, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1499, 1527–28 (2006). 
 120. Roger G. Noll, The Organization of Sports Leagues, 19 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 530, 531 (2003). 
 121. Id.  
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pool their rights to offer, jointly, products such as pooled broad-
casting rights or player apparel.122 The league quasi-integrates 
the individual teams to increase efficiency in organized play, 
save on transaction costs, and offer better products on the mar-
ket.  
Sports leagues operate in multi-sided markets wherein the 
teams compete for consumers (fans, viewers, purchasers of mer-
chandise) and for players. Two-sided markets are situations in 
which a “platform . . . facilitate[s] interactions between different 
end-users. The owner of this platform will usually try to court 
both sides of the market at prices that allow a profit.”123 How-
ever, two-sided markets are often faced with a perverse incentive 
to restrain one side of the market to benefit the other side of the 
market,124 which may trigger antitrust scrutiny. 
2. Traditional Sports Antitrust Concerns 
Antitrust law, also known as competition law, is deeply con-
cerned with cooperation among competitors. After providing a 
brief primer on antitrust law surrounding joint ventures, this 
Section outlines several anticompetitive practices that adversely 
affect the market for traditional sports. Because traditional 
sports economics serves as the base for esports economics,125 
there is a heightened possibility of mirrored attempts by esports 
league operators to control the esports market in the same man-
ner.  
It has been argued that the sports leagues in the United 
States have formed monopolies (or monopsonies126) despite the 
country’s capacity to support more than one league playing at 
the highest level.127 The Big Four—the National Football 
 
 122. See infra notes 260–67 and accompanying text. 
 123. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1528. 
 124. Id. at 1528–29. 
 125. See generally Chao, supra note 8 (discussing how esports mirror tradi-
tional sports); Holden et al., supra note 1 (describing the legal consequences of 
the classification of esports as a “sport”). 
 126. A monopsony is a market structure in which a single buyer substan-
tially controls the market of many sellers. The NFL could be considered a mo-
nopsonist of professional football players, while also being a monopolist over 
professional football games. See Xiao Gang Che & Brad Humphreys, Rival 
Sports League Formation and Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE 
SPORTS 11 (Rodríguez et al. eds., 2015). 
 127. Id. at 7; Noll, supra note 120, at 550 (“All nations allow the top leagues 
to be monopolies . . . .”). 
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League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey 
League, and Major League Baseball—have all faced rival 
leagues and dealt with them through absorption (e.g., NFL’s 
merger with the All-America Football Conference in 1949) or eco-
nomic competition (e.g., paying player salaries that are unsus-
tainable in lesser leagues).128 In fact, these sports leagues have 
even received special treatment either through the courts129 or 
by convincing Congress on antitrust matters.130 
Antitrust law deals with promoting fair competition for the 
benefit of consumers. The primary tool for protecting competi-
tion is the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act131 prohib-
its unreasonable restraints of trade;132 Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act prohibits monopolization or attempts thereof.133 Both sec-
tions target two or more entities acting to the detriment of a 
third party; this is known as concerted action.134 Concerted ac-
tion135 cases must show (1) the existence of a contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy among two or more separate entities136 that 
 
 128. NEIL LONGLEY, AN ABSENCE OF COMPETITION: THE SUSTAINED COM-
PETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE MONOPOLY SPORTS LEAGUES 1–2 (2013).  
 129. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922) (finding 
MLB exempt from antitrust law due to its local nature); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 
407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (maintaining the established aberration); Toolson v. 
N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (upholding MLB antitrust excep-
tion). 
 130. E.g., Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (exempt-
ing professional team sports from the antitrust laws). 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 132. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911). 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 2.  
 134. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) 
(denying applicability of Section 1 in concerted action cases where the entities 
are, in reality, a single entity and therefore only subject to Section 2). While 
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL determined that sports leagues are effectively car-
tels not falling within the single entity exception, it is unclear whether the case’s 
holding is controlling in the esports context. 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010). Put oth-
erwise, will the joint venture between the game publisher and the league be 
considered a single entity or concerted action? 
 135. Concerted action cases are different from independent action cases. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to concerted action while Section 2 ap-
plies to both, but only if the action “monopolizes” or “threatens actual monopo-
lization.” Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 191. 
 136. The Court has recently confirmed that a sports league, for purposes of 
the sale of licensing rights to third parties, does not fall within the single entity 
exception to antitrust laws. Id. at 204. Given the analogous structure of some 
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(2) unreasonably restrains trade, and (3) affects interstate or for-
eign commerce.137 Section 1 is important to the esports analysis 
because the court may fail to find monopolization by any one 
publisher in violation of Section 2 but recognize that the practice 
is unreasonable in violation of Section 1.138 
In addition to concerted action, Section 2, prohibiting mo-
nopoly, applies to independent action—when a single firm 
abuses its dominant status, known as market power, to the det-
riment of competitors.139 To be clear, the law does not punish a 
successful competitor but only one who quells competition. Mo-
nopolization, threatened monopolization, or conspiracy to mo-
nopolize can be achieved through different types of prohibited 
conducted.140 Despite being a more difficult claim, Section 2 is 
important in the esports context because it is unclear whether 
the judicial system would consider licensing deals as pooled li-
censing or the independent action of the publisher, which would 
not be subject to Section 1.141 
In either case, the courts must first define the market before 
addressing the negative effects of alleged anticompetitive con-
duct. Definition of a market142 is necessary because determining 
 
esports leagues, American Needle likely controls, though such a discussion is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
 137. See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 138. This may occur in the event that the court defines the market as esports 
rather than the individual titles. See Miroff, supra note 8, at 204–05. 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 140. For instance, exclusive dealing is when a retailer agrees to purchase 
from a supplier and promises to purchase from no other supplier. E.g., Am. Nee-
dle, 560 U.S. at 187. Refusal to supply an essential facility is when a company 
bottlenecks a market to deny entry by competitors by controlling an “essential 
facility.” In the sports league context, the American Pro Football League tried 
to characterize the Washington Redskins’ NFL stadium as an essential facility 
for the exhibition of professional football games, but the court disagreed and 
found that the Redskins’ refusal to share the stadium did not violate antitrust 
law. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 985–86 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 141. While the single entity exception to Section 1 liability is implicated due 
to the unique role of the game publisher in control of the leagues, determining 
the applicability of said exception is well beyond the scope of this Note. 
 142. This has been defined as “the area of effective competition.” Ohio v. Am. 
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. 
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). It is typically “the 
arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production oc-
curs.” Id. (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 15.02[B] (4th ed. 2017)).  
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whether the restraints “lessen or destroy competition” is effec-
tively a question of market power—the ability to raise price prof-
itability by restricting output.143 Markets can be spliced based 
off of distinctions in kind and distinctions of degree.144 For in-
stance, courts have repeatedly held that individual sports con-
stitute separate markets and, within those markets, the colle-
giate may be considered separate from the professional or even 
pre-professional markets.145 Consumer demand effectively de-
termines if two markets are actually one based on fungibility and 
substitution. 
The challenged conduct in the defined market may be illegal 
per se or unreasonable under a rule of reason analysis. Price fix-
ing146 and geographic market allocation147 are examples of con-
certed conduct illegal per se because the act “would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put.”148 However, when the practice falls outside of judicially 
enumerated categories of per se conduct, or where “restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” 
the restraint should be viewed under the rule of reason.149 Under 
this analysis, the court conducts a balancing test weighing the 
practice’s (1) unreasonableness and competitive harm (2) against 
its pro-competitive justifications (3) in light of less harmful al-
ternatives to achieving the pro-competitive justification. Given 
the need to cooperate in a sports league, this framework merits 
significant attention.  
 
 143. Id. (quoting Walker Process Equip., 382 U.S. at 177). 
 144. Id.  
 145. E.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 
(1984) (separating college football from professional football); Int’l Boxing Club 
of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959) (finding championship 
boxing separate from boxing contests generally). 
 146. Price fixing is when two or more entities agree to set the price for a 
product jointly instead of competing for consumers. E.g., United States v. Tren-
ton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).  
 147. Geographic market allocation would occur when two or more entities 
agree not to compete within particular territories.  
 148. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1979) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 
(1978)). Other examples include group boycotts—joint refusals not to deal with 
a particular vendor or purchaser—and tying arrangements—an agreement to 
sell a product or service conditioned upon a different, tied, product or the prom-
ise not to purchase that tied product from competitors. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 149. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101.  
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To begin, the plaintiff must show that the restraint on trade 
is unreasonable150 and would harm competition, taking into ac-
count the business, the condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.151 
Then, the defendant may counter the unreasonableness by 
providing a procompetitive justification that outweighs the anti-
competitive effects. The procompetitive justification in the sports 
context is competitive balance: 
Competitive balance means in essence that all of the league’s teams are 
of sufficiently comparable strength that . . . fans will be in enough 
doubt about the probable outcome of each game and of the various di-
vision races that they will be interested in watching the games, thus 
supporting the teams’. . . revenues.152 
Upon showing of a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff 
can, theoretically, question the legitimacy of the justification by 
showing less harmful alternatives to achieving the same goals. 
However, most cases and the hearings before Congress focus on 
two elements: either the restraint is not unreasonable or com-
petitive balance outweighs the harms.  
In the application of both the per se and rule of reason tests, 
history, from about the 1950s onwards, has defined several an-
ticompetitive practices in sports, including “awarding territorial 
protection; creating the reserve clause and player draft; setting 
minimum prices; giving the commissioner power to unilaterally 
issue edicts; and, later, pursuing national television con-
tracts.”153 Other antitrust issues stemmed from the major 
leagues’ treatment of players and hoarding of talent in the minor 
 
 150. Unreasonableness has been a matter of judicial policy either favoring 
consumer protection or market protection. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE AN-
TITRUST PARADOX 405–07 (1978) (arguing for consumer protection), with Khan, 
supra note 7, at 737–39 (criticizing pure consumer protection tests). 
 151. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). For a sports example, the 
Supreme Court found that the National Collegiate Athletics Association vio-
lated Section 1 of the Sherman Act when it restricted television of games to 
encourage live attendance because it reduced supply. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Okla., 468 U.S. at 88. 
 152. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 745 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 153. DAVID GEORGE SURDAM, THE BIG LEAGUES GO TO WASHINGTON: CON-
GRESS AND SPORTS ANTITRUST, 1951–1989, at 30 (2015).  
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leagues.154 (Esports have, at the very least, adopted the territo-
rial divisions,155 player rights issues,156 and pooled international 
broadcasting practices.157) At that time, the leagues used two 
primary defenses: (1) the body before which the league is appear-
ing is not the appropriate authority to rule on the practice158 and 
(2) the restraints on trade are justifiable under competitive bal-
ance. Teams and leagues used these arguments to obtain anti-
trust exemptions to allow for current practices and to rebuff Con-
gress’s attempts to disrupt the industry’s trend of self-
regulation.159 
3. Critiquing Competitive Balance and the Competing 
Competitions Alternative 
Sports antitrust academics continue to seek alternatives to 
the current economic practices; the crux of the competing com-
petitions theory is the idea that more than a singular champion-
ship can take place so as to introduce rivals into the industry 
thereby incentivizing an efficient market through competi-
tion.160 American sports leagues—perhaps unnecessarily—all 
result in a single championship competition. Competitive bal-
ance assumes that consumers would not be interested in having 
multiple first-place teams, particularly if they never played each 
 
 154. Id. at 32–33, 48, 56 (discussing the effects of the reserve clause on sal-
ary negotiations, the farm systems whereby a single team may control hundreds 
of minor league players, and the culture of keeping salaries secret); see also 
Study of Monopoly Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly 
Power of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 6, Organized Baseball, 82d Cong. 
2 (1952) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary); Peskin, supra note 39 (discussing antitrust issues regarding salary caps).  
 155. It should be noted that only the Overwatch League has steadfastly held 
onto the city-based team branding methodology. Dota 2 teams are only affiliated 
by organizations and split into regions. League of Legends teams are affiliated 
by organization and by region (e.g. North America, Korea, Europe, etc.). See 
Philip Kollar, Overwatch League Is Blizzard’s Ambitious New Esports Org, In-
cludes City-Based Teams, POLYGON (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.polygon.com/ 
2016/11/4/13511762/overwatch-league-is-blizzards-ambitious-new-esports 
-org-includes-city [https://perma.cc/NB9N-3NDV]. 
 156. Heggem, supra note 2.  
 157. Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, ESPORTS OBSERVER, https:// 
esportsobserver.com/the-esports-eco-system [https://perma.cc/C25R-8SVG].  
 158. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 47.  
 159. The exact arguments will be considered in turn in Part III so as to de-
termine their applicability in the esports context.  
 160. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1515. 
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other to determine the ultimate champion. However, the English 
Premier League represents a successful league whose teams 
sometimes compete in more than one championship.161 Teams 
are not restricted from competing in multiple tournaments.162 
The promotion and relegation system also allows new meritori-
ous teams to enter the market if they successfully work their way 
up through the divisional system.163 Fan interest remains high 
despite the practices deemed necessary for the maintenance of 
competitive balance.164  
Competing competitions, despite some drawbacks, incentiv-
ize two levels of competition: intraleague and interleague. On 
the one hand, teams compete intraleague to stay within the high-
est echelon of professional play. This “open architecture” means 
that teams must consistently invest in their players to ensure 
competitive success.165 However, the open architecture also 
means that teams are more risky investments for sponsors in the 
event of relegation or poor performance. On the other hand, the 
league competes with other leagues for concurrent viewership 
and for team participation. Together, competing competitions 
represents an alternative conceptualization of sports leagues 
that incentivizes competition by decoupling leagues and tourna-
ments from teams. It has not been addressed by Congress or the 
courts as a viable alternative or weakening of the competitive 
balance argument, but esports has begun to experiment with 
this economic structure.  
D. ESPORTS: STAKEHOLDERS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLISHER-
CONTROLLED LEAGUE 
Having now discussed the two broad analogous industries of 
sports and entertainment, as well as the copyright and antitrust 
laws underlying each, it is necessary to focus on esports itself. 
First, this Section discusses the various stakeholders in esports 
 
 161. Id. at 1522. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1523.  
 164. See generally ERNST & YOUNG LLP, PREMIER LEAGUE: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL IMPACT 4, 17 (2019), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY 
-Premier-League-economic-and-social-impact-January-2019/$FILE/EY 
-Premier-League-economic-and-social-impact-January-2019.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/3VZ6-WBG8] (discussing growth of the Premier League and its role in fos-
tering soccer, even in other leagues). 
 165. Mehra & Zuercher, supra note 119, at 1524. 
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and their role within the industry. Next, it breaks down the dif-
ferent distinctions in the industry, namely by game type or genre 
(differences in kind) and by level of professionalism (differences 
in degree). Finally, this Section narrows the focus to publisher-
controlled leagues as a particularly problematic phenomenon 
triggering antitrust concerns.  
1. Esports Stakeholders 
In addition to the league, esports have stabilized to include 
four classes of stakeholders: players, organizations (teams),166 
channelers, and tournament operators (including the pub-
lisher).167 Each category of stakeholders will be discussed in 
turn.  
The first stakeholder is the player. Consider the typical sce-
nario: a person plays a video game such as League of Legends to 
the point that he168 is no longer satisfied with casual play and 
commits a significant amount of time to improving his mechani-
cal skills.169 He may choose to climb through the built-in online 
leaderboard system of the game (e.g., the ranked queue170 for 
 
 166. Throughout this Note, the term “organization” is used as opposed to 
“team” because the corporate entity invests in more than just professional play-
ers for a single league in a single esports title. An organization may boast a 
competitive roster in several esports titles and multiple signed streamers. 
 167. Chao, supra note 8, at 744 (listing game publishers, tournament organ-
izers, teams, players, sponsors, and streaming sites as industry stakeholders); 
An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16 (describing the entities 
involved in the esports industry); see also Miroff, supra note 8, at 187–89 (listing 
publishers, organizers, broadcasters, teams, professional players, viewers, and 
advertisers as entities). 
 168. While women compete and play video games professionally, the indus-
try is dominated by men. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 118–28, for a 
discussion of women in gaming and a criticism of the mythos of the lack of 
women in gaming. This Note will use the pronoun “he” to refer to gamers.  
 169. See generally Graham Ashton, What Is the Optimum Training Time for 
Esports Players?, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Dec. 28, 2017), https://esportsobserver 
.com/optimum-player-training-time [https://perma.cc/Q3BY-US8E] (finding 
play and practice times of over fifteen hours a day). 
 170. A ranked queue refers to the matchmaking system that pits the player 
against those of similar caliber based on criteria within the game. The player 
has the ability to “climb the ladder” by consistently winning and showing that 
he is of a better caliber. The system is ranked in so much as there are different 
tiers and eventually a leaderboard for the best of the best.  
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League of Legends171 or Dota 2), search for competitive team-
mates online, or enter amateur tournaments. Like other esports 
athletes, he is competing against all other players for recognition 
by a professional organization.172 The reality is that the pool of 
professional video game players is incredibly shallow relative to 
the number of players generally.173 In the interim, or in the event 
of failure, he may opt to try his hand at personal streaming174 or 
play at the collegiate level.175  
 
 171. In fact, such ranked play is required for League of Legends. N. AM. 
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2018 OFFICIAL RULES NA LCS 
AND NA LACS § 2.4 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 NA LCS RULES], https://esports 
-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/production/files/rules/2018_LCS_LACS_Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2LW-4UX9]. 
 172. See Michael Arin, Esports & Employment After Dynamex, ESPORTS B. 
ASS’N J. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://esportsbar.org/journals/2019/10/esports-and 
-employment-after-dynamex [https://perma.cc/C776-DK2M], for an in-depth 
look at the life of the player and his relationship to the organization.  
 173. For example, League of Legends boasts a monthly user-base of over 100 
million players worldwide. Paul Tassi, Riot Games Reveals ‘League of Legends’ 
Has 100 Million Monthly Players, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2016/09/13/riot-games-reveals-league-of-legends 
-has-100-million-monthly-players/#3dde46fe5aa8 [https://perma.cc/45JX 
-3VKG]. Even using a conservative estimate of players that engage in competi-
tive ranked play, this number still hovers over 1.6 million in North America 
alone. DrCyanide, League’s Decline – By the Numbers, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: 
BOARDS (Sept. 9, 2018), https://boards.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/c/general 
-discussion/ka7IqcPM-leagues-decline-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/JD32-
HR2U]. In comparison, the League of Legends Championship Series (LCS) con-
sists of ten teams of five players for a total of fifty possible starting positions in 
the United States. Even including other leagues, back-up players, academy-tier 
teams, and staff (analysts, coaches, etc.), the couple hundred possible positions 
are insignificant when compared to the number of players generally.  
 174. Compare Joshua Calixto, Meet Michael ‘Imaqtpie’ Santana, the World’s 
Best ‘League of Legends’ Streamer, ROLLINGSTONE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://web 
.archive.org/web/20180617153433/http://www.rollingstone.com/glixel/news/ 
meet-imaqtpie-the-worlds-best-league-streamer-w473364 [https://perma.cc/ 
K6UN-88SQ] (former professional turned online personality), with Zachary 
Scuderi, Sneaky Shares How He Became a Pro League of Legends Player, 
IBUYPOWER: BLOG (Aug. 6, 2013), http://blog.ibuypower.com/blog/2013/08/06/ 
sneaky-shares-how-he-became-a-pro-league-of-legends-player/ [https://perma 
.cc/E3G6-W5HY] (current professional player for Cloud9). 
 175. Michael Arin, Matchmaking Mishaps: NCAA Amateurism and Colle-
giate Esports, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO BLOG (Oct. 31, 2018), https:// 
minnesotalawreview.org/2018/10/31/matchmaking-mishaps-ncaa-amateurism 
-and-collegiate-esports-2/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/9S6R-CVU5]; 
John T. Holden et al., A Short Treatise on Esports and the Law: How America 
Regulates Its Next National Pastime, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) 
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Meanwhile, organizations are akin to teams in the tradi-
tional sports leagues; they compete in the league, for players, 
and for fandom. For instance, “LoL esports represents profes-
sional League of Legends on a global scale. . . . Each 10-team 
league competes over nine weeks, with every team facing one 
another twice per split, for a total of 18 games each.”176 The prod-
uct is the competitive league, akin to traditional sports fran-
chises.177 The league imposes internal rules on the organizations 
such as minimum player salary,178 scheduling, dispute resolu-
tion via the league commissioner,179 territory allocation,180 and 
player eligibility requirements (e.g., must be eighteen or older to 
play), including regional residency requirements (e.g., citizen-
ship).181 While the leagues often publish some rules publicly,182 
others such as the league operating agreement are kept secret. 
 
(manuscript at 62–69) (discussing issues related to collegiate esports); see infra 
notes 202–07 and accompanying text. 
 176. About LoL Esports, RIOT GAMES, https://eu.lolesports.com/en/about/ 
about-lol-esports [https://perma.cc/QKA4-QKM2]. Since the rebranding and 
separation of the North American (LCS) and European leagues (League of Leg-
ends European Championship Series (LEC)), the format and number of teams 
stayed the same, but each league now has a distinct identity. Jack Stewart, Riot 
Rebrands NA LCS Following the Creation of the LEC, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Dec. 
14, 2018), https://esportsobserver.com/riot-rebrands-na-lcs/ [https://perma.cc/ 
93VS-5VS9]; see Riot Games: Creating a New Era for Esports, DESIGNSTUDIO, 
https://design.studio/work/lec [https://perma.cc/RGQ7-2VYS] (describing the 
LEC rebrand). 
 177. See, e.g., Imad Khan, Riot Releases Details on NA LCS Franchising with 
$10M Flat-Fee Buy-in, ESPN (June 1, 2017), https://www.espn.com/esports/ 
story/_/id/19511222/riot-releases-details-na-lcs-franchising-10m-flat-fee-buy-in 
[https://perma.cc/QR95-6P7E]. 
 178. See generally Bayliss, supra note 2, at 372 (questioning whether the 
mandatory minimum salaries, among other league rules, make the league an 
employer of the players).  
 179. E.g., Chris Greeley, Quick Notes: How We Make the Match Schedule, 
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS (May 1, 2018), https://nexus.leagueoflegends.com/en-us/ 
2018/05/quick-notes-how-we-make-the-match-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R57K-ERWJ] (explaining NA LCS Commissioner Greeley’s attempt at provid-
ing competitive balance through scheduling).  
 180. E.g., Susie Kim (@lilsusie), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2018, 11:28 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/lilsusie/status/1025599453636395008 [https://perma.cc/6Q67 
-KXEA] (lamenting the inability to do a fan meet-and-greet event in Seoul as 
general manager of the London Spitfire because “there are [Overwatch] region 
regulations and . . . Dynasty had said that they did not want to give us permis-
sion in their region”). 
 181. See, e.g., 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171, §§ 2.1–6. 
 182. E.g., id.  
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Nevertheless, public information, leaked information, and social 
media posts by players and organization owners reveal a struc-
ture that mimics a traditional sports league.183 Organizations ul-
timately serve as a middleman between the player and the 
league or tournament operators.  
Channelers invest in the esports industry or aid in the dis-
tribution of the product to a greater audience. Channelers in-
clude streaming platforms such as Twitch, YouTube, and even 
Valve that compete to provide the best interactive viewing expe-
rience184 and sponsors who provide financial support to players, 
organizations, leagues, streaming platforms, and tournament 
organizers.185 While channelers are not direct content producers 
like the other industry stakeholders, esports would collapse 
without the added value of distribution and financial invest-
ment. 
Finally, tournament operators facilitate the relationship be-
tween teams and players and teams and channelers. Tourna-
ments may either be independent or publisher-controlled. Or-
ganizers such as ESL, DreamHack, and Major League Gaming 
that compete for the in-person attendance and online viewership 
license the game from the publisher.186 In comparison, pub-
lisher-controlled leagues—such as Riot Games for League of Leg-
ends Championship Series, Activision Blizzard for Overwatch 
League, and Valve for Dota 2 Pro Circuit—benefit from the close 
relationship with the publisher; publishers have no incentive to 
withhold rights to the leagues they control.  
Esports have greatly veered away from the traditional mon-
etization process of video game rights. Instead of relying on game 
sales, many titles are free to play (e.g., Dota 2 and League of Leg-
ends) through an end user license agreement and subject to the 
terms of use; even games with an initial purchase cost generate 
 
 183. See Burk, supra note 103, at 1540–41.  
 184. Erik Kain, Valve Launched Steam.tv, a New Twitch Competitor, by Mis-
take, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2018/08/ 
18/valve-launched-twitch-competitor-steam-tv-early-by-mistake/ 
#6be5f1243a53 [https://perma.cc/U4US-CPPT]. 
 185. Ben Fischer, Esports’ Next Big Mission: Win Over Sponsors, SPORTS 
BUS. J. (May 28, 2018), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/ 
2018/05/28/In-Depth/Esports.aspx [https://perma.cc/77ZY-GP2T]; An Introduc-
tion to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16; Peskin, supra note 39. Sponsors 
sponsor players, teams, or tournaments.  
 186. An Introduction to the Esports Ecosystem, supra note 16. 
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more revenue through microtransactions of cosmetic items.187 
Secondly, users are no longer simply consuming (i.e., playing) 
the game, but instead they are live streaming competitive play 
largely supported through online advertising to consumers 
watching online.188 Detached from physical games and in-person 
audiences, tournaments and esports as a whole depend on mon-
etization of intellectual property rights. In the end, who controls 
these rights—players, organizations, channelers, independent 
tournament organizers, or the publisher—is of immense im-
portance. 
2. Esports Potential Market Considerations 
Having described the playing field of stakeholders, it is also 
important to outline different potential markets.189 The question 
of “what is the market” is both pivotal to antitrust law and in-
credibly elusive in the esports context.190 As mentioned in the 
sports context, the market is defined based on demand substitu-
tion.191 Consumer demand often falls into particularly identifia-
ble categories based on divisions in kind and divisions in degree.  
In the esports industry, distinctions in kind revolve around 
the type of video games, or, on a particularized scale, individual 
games.192 The first type of distinction is based on genre. Major 
esports titles can be categorized into Multiplayer Online Battle 
Arenas (MOBAs) (e.g., League of Legends and Dota 2),193 First-
 
 187. Darren Heitner, A Look Inside Riot Games, from $320,000 Player Sala-
ries to Using Esports as a Catalyst for Sales, FORBES (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2018/05/02/a-look-inside-riot 
-games-from-320000-player-salaries-to-using-esports-as-a-catalyst-for-sales/ 
#60596ab2c6a7 [https://perma.cc/JM6E-3JVN].  
 188. Fischer, supra note 185. 
 189. The purpose of this Note is not to present a critical analysis of the mar-
ket. See Miroff, supra note 8, for an answer to that question. However, recog-
nizing the distinctions is important for understanding the encompassing nature 
of the term “esports.”  
 190. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018); Fischer, supra 
note 185. The focus of this Note is not an analysis of the proper market for an-
titrust purposes. Nevertheless, a description of the market subdivisions is nec-
essary to understand exactly why intellectual property law is in tension with 
antitrust law—at least in the esports context.  
 191. See supra Part I.C.  
 192. Miroff, supra note 8, at 199–204.  
 193. MOBAs involve two teams controlling characters in a battle to destroy 
the other team’s base. 
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Person Shooters (FPSs) (e.g., Overwatch, Counter Strike: Global 
Offensive, Call of Duty, and Halo),194 Battle Royale (e.g., Fortnite 
and PUBG),195 and fighting games (e.g., Dragon Ball Z, Super 
Smash Bros., and Street Fighter).196 However, games, despite be-
ing in the same genre, are generally not fungible.197 Despite sim-
ilarities across games, professional players do not compete in 
multiple titles, and spectatorship trends suggest that people are 
attracted only to a single game.198 However, esports as a whole 
tends to attract viewers from one identifiable demographic re-
gardless of genre or title,199 therefore having the same value to 
advertisers (for whom tournaments compete).200 Distinctions in 
kind suggest two possible market definitions, consistent with 
Miroff ’s analysis: individual esports titles or esports gener-
ally.201  
Distinctions in degree also suggest a vertical hierarchy in 
the esports industry: collegiate,202 amateur, and professional.203 
 
 194. FPSs can be both team and single-player events where the player plays 
from the perspective of a character with a gun. The objectives of the game vary 
from objective control to simply killing other players. 
 195. The newest form of competitive play, Battle Royales, take the FPS game 
type and expand the number of competitors, pitting the player or team against 
hundreds of others in a king-of-the-hill, last-man-standing experience. 
 196. Fighting games are single or duo events where players control charac-
ters and fight the other players in a match of survival. 
 197. Saying that League of Legends and Dota 2 are fungible because they are 
both MOBAs would be like saying football and soccer are interchangeable be-
cause they both have a ball. 
 198. Maddy Myers, Survey: 42 Percent of Esports Viewers Don’t Play the 
Games They Watch, KOTAKU: COMPETE (May 12, 2017), https://compete.kotaku 
.com/survey-42-percent-of-esports-viewers-dont-play-the-gam-1795163095 
[https://perma.cc/KZN3-JE6X] (finding that 70% of viewers only watch a single 
esports title).  
 199. CHASE BUCKLE & JASON MANDER, GLOBALWEBINDEX, ESPORTS 
TRENDS REPORT 2018, at 3–4 (2018), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/304927/ 
Downloads/Esports-report.pdf?t=1528372092399 [https://perma.cc/SWB7 
-UJM2] (defining the average viewer as a young, affluent man). 
 200. Cf. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250–
52 (1959) (discussing the different markets for promotion of nonchampionship 
and championship boxing based on valuation of broadcasting rights).  
 201. Miroff, supra note 8, at 199–205.  
 202. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293 (2012) (providing limited antitrust excep-
tions to professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey telecasts so long 
as they do not compete with intercollegiate athletics). 
 203. As mentioned previously, esports mimic sports in even artificial means. 
  
2020] ESPORTS 1619 
 
Unlike the collegiate scene in traditional sports, there does not 
appear to be a unique demand for collegiate esports.204 Further-
more, the collegiate esports market is not a gateway for profes-
sional play like in traditional sports.205 Instead, the professional 
league is generally prohibited from interfering with collegiate 
play.206 In its place, some leagues foster an amateur market that 
serves as a talent scouting ground for future professional play-
ers.207 Organizations may be required to maintain both profes-
sional and amateur teams.208 Yet neither the collegiate nor the 
amateur market has been effectively capitalized by producing a 
distinguishable audience from the professional scene.209 In the 
end, the professional scene remains preeminent, and the colle-
giate and amateurs scenes, at the very least, should not be con-
sidered substitutable products.  
Despite its relative youth, the esports industry is rich, com-
plex, and largely modeled after traditional sports. The primary 
stakeholders combine forces to provide a unified product: a com-
petitive league for a particular esports title. The economics have 
shifted from game sales to primarily sponsorships and advertis-
ing revenue. But esports have begun to diverge from traditional 
sports by foregoing the college-to-pro pipeline and blending the 
distinctions in degree of play. Most importantly, the esports 
leagues already grapple with complex intellectual property is-
sues in the sale of these rights so central to the industry. 
 
Despite a lack of demand for collegiate esports broadcasts, many publishers as-
sist the college scene due to a large player market.  
 204. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 
(1984) (describing the “uniquely attractive” audience of NCAA football games); 
Noll, supra note 120, at 534 (highlighting distinct markets of collegiate and pro-
fessional sports). 
 205. Mitch Reames, The Role of College Programs in Pro Esports, SPORT-
TECHIE (May 7, 2018), https://www.sporttechie.com/role-of-college-esports-ncaa 
-league-of-legends-overwatch [https://perma.cc/HK26-RYKR].  
 206. See, e.g., 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171, § 5.5 (restricting recruit-
ment of players already committed to collegiate League of Legends on scholar-
ship). 
 207. See generally id. § 1 (referencing the North American League of Leg-
ends Academy Championship Series).  
 208. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing farm system). 
 209. Contra Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 111 (distinguish-
ing collegiate athletics from professional telecasts based on “an audience 
uniquely attractive to advertisers”).  
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3. The Rise of Publisher-Controlled Leagues 
The most successful esports title is League of Legends, cre-
ated by Riot Games; an up-and-coming title is Overwatch by 
Blizzard Entertainment. The competitive scenes for both games, 
at the highest echelon, have significant involvement from enti-
ties related to the game publishers.210 While some authors prefer 
the term “developer-sponsored leagues,”211 this Note uses the 
term “publisher-controlled leagues” to refer to joint ventures be-
tween teams with significant involvement and rule-setting by 
the rights holders. The difference can be explained by the change 
in intent of the publisher; today, publishers intend to capitalize 
on esports as opposed to remaining pure game producers.212 
Publisher-controlled leagues are successful, in part, due to 
vertical integration efficiencies. Publisher-controlled leagues 
wholly consolidate the industry into one efficient league. For in-
stance, Riot Games, through the League of Legends Champion-
ship Series (LCS) creates a product: competitive playing of 
League of Legends. Riot Games, through a franchise system, 
brings ten organizations under its umbrella. Riot Games also 
employs broadcast talent and a professional studio crew to create 
online streaming content. Using its insider knowledge, Riot 
Games’s development team keeps the broadcast talent fully in-
formed of any game changes. Additionally, Riot Games negoti-
ates partnerships with outside sponsors on behalf of the league. 
Internationally, Riot Games advertises its league through the 
game client directly to players. What is left to be seen is what 
Riot Games would do if another tournament challenged its dom-
inant position as the preeminent League of Legends league.  
 
 210. It is unclear the exact relation between, for instance, the League of Leg-
ends Championship Series and Riot Games, but shared personnel suggest a 
close relation if nothing else.  
 211. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 8, at 745.  
 212. Compare id. (“‘[Game developers] still see themselves first and foremost 
as a game producer—not sports provider.’” (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 
166)), with Webster, supra note 18 (describing publisher’s acquisition of gaming 
group “to create the ESPN of e-sports”).  
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II.  PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED LEAGUES: SPORTS & 
ENTERTAINMENT & ANTITRUST ISSUES   
This Note argues three interrelated ideas. First, esports is a 
combination of both sports and entertainment industries. In con-
sidering competition in esports, both sports and entertainment 
jurisprudence should be considered. Second, the crux of this Note 
is that approaching publisher-controlled leagues from both 
sports and entertainment perspectives paints the holistic and 
problematic potential for anticompetitive manipulation of intel-
lectual property by publisher-controlled leagues. The publisher 
can manipulate its deep copyright control to eliminate or weaken 
leagues competing with its favored league. Finally, neither the 
esports industry nor the courts will solve this problem. Like tra-
ditional sports, esports will push back with the idea of self-regu-
lation. Like entertainment, courts will struggle to understand 
the tech-centered industry. Combined, publisher-controlled 
leagues will reignite tension between copyright and sports anti-
trust principles, and the industry remains unstable.  
A. ESPORTS: SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT 
While the sports or entertainment classification is im-
portant in certain contexts, the antitrust context requires a more 
holistic approach that recognizes both industries as analogous 
and helpful in the analysis. As history has shown, video games 
underwent a sportsification.213 As the demand for organized 
competitive playing of video games grew, the esports industry 
modeled itself after traditional sports. Games went from being 
personal to an opportunity for spectatorship, professionalism, 
and organized competition.214 However, cabining esports to 
sports jurisprudence fails to recognize the importance of the in-
tellectual property rights that form the base of the industry and 
the entertainment industry’s rocky past with using licensing 
agreements to achieve market leverage.215 Yet, framing esports 
as mere entertainment neglects the intentional economic struc-
turing of the industry and the historically identifiable anticom-
petitive practices.216 In short, the classification of esports as a 
 
 213. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.  
 214. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 45 (discussing the professionalization 
of video games); TAYLOR, supra note 19 (discussing the rise in spectatorship).  
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. See supra Part I.C.  
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sport is not determinative in the antitrust context and should be 
eschewed in favor of a more holistic approach, lest the analysis 
remain incomplete. 
B. PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED LEAGUES: BENEVOLENT 
OVERLORDS 
Publisher-controlled leagues, through innovative intellec-
tual property licensing and enforcement, can control the market 
for their esports titles in violation of antitrust laws unless Con-
gress steps in. Anticompetitive practices damage consumer wel-
fare. This Section discusses how innovative intellectual property 
management by publishers can serve to effectuate the same 
practices that drew Congress’s attention to traditional sports 
leagues’ antitrust violations. Worse, intellectual property law 
could insulate the league operator from antitrust scrutiny, par-
ticularly with the lack of jurisprudence on copyright and anti-
trust interplay. After showing why the lack of limitations on cop-
yright licensing allows for such broad control by the publisher, 
this Section focuses on the rule of reason analysis of anticompet-
itive practices identified in traditional sports leagues to high-
light the court’s likely struggle to reign in anticompetitive prac-
tices. 
1. Downstream Control via Copyright 
The rights of video games to public performance and deriv-
ative works are inherently implicated in the user-generated con-
tent produced in the esports industry. Players play the video 
game and broadcast their performances through online stream-
ing sites according to the end user license agreement, and sub-
ject to any terms of service often automatically assigning back to 
the game publisher any derivative copyrights.217 However, 
whether this performance constitutes infringement upon the 
game publisher’s copyright and the enforceability of the terms of 
service remains hotly debated.218  
 
 217. E.g., RIOT GAMES, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS TERMS OF USE (NA) § 6.1 
(2017), https://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/termsofuse#user-content 
[https://perma.cc/73V9-YTBK]. 
 218. Compare Hagen, supra note 96, at 265 (arguing that competitive play 
and streaming falls within the fair use exception of copyright law), with Brusa, 
supra note 84, at 246 (finding that streaming copyrighted content is an infring-
ing public performance). 
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As described in Part I, all arguments in favor of divvying up 
the rights over the video game streams face significant chal-
lenges. The publishers point to cases like Midway Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Artic International Inc., holding that the publisher’s 
copyright extends to every iteration of the video game,219 and 
Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., determining that 
mere play in an arcade—much less than public broadcast 
online—constitutes infringing public performance220 to defend 
its deep control over the copyrighted material.221 The passage of 
time and changing technology may warrant a reconsideration of 
the interactivity, fair use, and copyright misuse arguments. The 
contribution of players, broadcasters, and the like on top of the 
mere playing of the video games continues to grow to such an 
extent that, were the video stripped of these contributions, it 
would be bereft of any entertainment value. Similarly, the pas-
sage of time has led the patent misuse doctrine to become robust 
while copyright misuse atrophies, despite increased attentive-
ness by the Federal Trade Commission to competition and con-
sumer welfare in technology- and copyright-dependent indus-
tries dealing with copyright.222 
However, under current caselaw, the exclusivity of copy-
right law allows the game publisher to restrict its product’s es-
ports market, divide it as it pleases, or shut it down entirely at 
any time, regardless of any investment made by stakeholders. 
While some limits exist, courts are hesitant to blunt the copy-
right sword and shield. In a rare video game case, Atari Games 




 219. 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 220. 883 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Valve Corp. v. Sierra Entm’t 
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (citing Red-Baron favorably 
in determining that playing videogames in a cyber-café constitutes a public per-
formance). 
 221. See generally Harttung, supra note 11 (critiquing this deep control of 
downstream markets based on ambiguity of copyright jurisprudence).  
 222. See supra notes 5–6. 
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[W]hen the patented product is so successful that it creates its own eco-
nomic market or consumes a large section of an existing market, the 
aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first 
glance, wholly at odds. . . .  
  There may on occasion exist, therefore, a fine line between actions 
protecting the legitimate interests of a patent owner and antitrust law 
violations.223 
Equally so, certain markets are entirely dependent upon copy-
righted materials, such as the music and video game markets.224 
This would be particularly applicable to the esports industry if 
the court determines the relevant antitrust market to be an in-
dividual game. Hence, Atari’s caution rings true for copyright as 
well.  
While the Federal Trade Commission has stated that own-
ership of a copyright does not presumptively confer upon its 
owner any market power,225 the Supreme Court has also recog-
nized, albeit in dicta, that certain uses of copyright could run 
afoul of antitrust. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., the Court relegated the blanket licensing of 
copyrighted music to a rule of reason analysis.226 Similar to the 
logic used in joint-ventures,227 the Court reasoned that “the line 
of commerce . . . being restrained, the performing rights to copy-
righted music, exists at all only because of the copyright laws.”228 
The blanket licensing of copyrighted music was not per se illegal 
because it could have been “reasonably necessary to effectuate 
the [copy]rights that are granted. . . .”229 The Court left open the 
question of what types of arrangements should be deemed “rea-
sonably necessary.” Nor have the courts adequately considered 
copyright antitrust violations under the per se or rule of reason 
 
 223. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 224. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–19 
(1979). 
 225. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2 
(2007); see also Mediacom Commc’ns Corp. v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., 460 F. Supp. 
2d 1012, 1027–28 (S.D. Iowa) (recognizing the same). 
 226. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 24. 
 227. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 228. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 18. 
 229. Id. at 19.  
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analysis outside of pooled rights.230 Without guidance, the indus-
tries dependent upon copyright are left to decide the line be-
tween legitimate exercises of copyright and antitrust violations.  
As a result, tournaments and other downstream partici-
pants (e.g., players) unwilling to challenge the status quo 
through antitrust suits against the publisher and its leagues 
must then license or willingly infringe. Should the publisher 
bring suit for infringement, the independent tournament opera-
tor may assert that the tournament obtained a valid license from 
the players (the independent-interactivity argument, as opposed 
to one based on derivative works) and raise the defenses of fair 
use and copyright misuse (the “equitable arguments”). However, 
to be successful, the independent copyright argument and the 
defense of fair use would require overturning of decades-old prec-
edent.231 Therefore, the defendant would be left to stand on the 
ill-defined and ill-received defense of copyright misuse.232 While 
any one of the arguments or defenses may prove successful, in-
fringers would need to bear the cost of court much like Spotify 
bore the initial suits for non-payment of royalties.233 This risk 
and the current environment of self-regulation allows the pub-
lisher to exert substantial control over the esports market for its 
product. Current case law at the intersection of copyright and 
antitrust fails to clearly delineate the line between legitimate 
rights and violations of antitrust law, only bolstering the idea of 
deep control of downstream markets.  
2. Copyright Licensing Strategy to Antitrust Concern 
Through careful licensing of the publisher’s intellectual 
property over the underlying video game, the publisher can sup-
press competition by playing with the ambiguous limits of its 
rights. However, esports is modeled upon sports economics, and 
 
 230. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 
(1948) (pooled copyrighted movies); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand 
from Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (upholding blanket licensing under rule of reason 
analysis after the Court’s ruling that per se analysis was improper); Alden-Ro-
chelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 
894 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (pooled copyrighted music). 
 231. See supra Part I.B. 
 232. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 233. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.  
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traditional sports’ long history with antitrust has established 
definite anticompetitive conduct. This Subsection identifies four 
anticompetitive practices achievable through copyright licensing 
and exclusivity: restricting the supply of players, divvying up 
territory to particular teams, pooled broadcasting rights, and 
shutting down other competitions. Then, the Subsection will look 
at the historical justifications of the anticompetitive—but cur-
rently allowed—conduct and determine the applicability to es-
ports. Ultimately, the crossroads creates a paradox of simulta-
neously legitimate exercises of copyright and illegitimate 
antitrust problems.  
a. Restricting Supply of Players Through Field of Use 
Sports leagues have an incentive to control the pool of pos-
sible players. If a competing league cannot obtain the same qual-
ity and quantity of talent, the competing league will be uncom-
petitive and be forced out of the market. Without a competing 
league, the standing league is in a better position to negotiate 
rights and player salaries.  
In the traditional sports context, player rights concerns 
drove litigation and provided the most energized offense against 
the league’s control over the market. Player rights can be divided 
into two issues: vertical integration through the farm system234 
and salary restrictions.235 Although both practices found their 
strength in the reserve clause—the clause signing away the 
player’s rights to play in the league even after the conclusion of 
the employment contract,236 vertical integration is possible even 
without such a clause. For example, when professional teams in 
the MLB (and to a lesser extent the NHL) locked up talent in the 
minors, they effectively bottlenecked the flow of players into pro-
fessional teams. Wealthy teams could buy as many players as 
 
 234. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 93.  
 235. See Peskin, supra note 39. 
 236. The reserve clause was a common clause in an athlete’s employment 
contract that stated that the rights to the player were retained by the team upon 
expiration of the contract. This system has been replaced by free agency. Es-
ports titles have already adopted free agency. See, e.g., Jacob Wolf, Six Teams, 
Six Moves during League of Legends Free Agency, ESPN (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/28080255/six-teams-six-moves-league 
-legends-free-agency [https://perma.cc/95WY-RDZP] (discussing free agency pe-
riod for LCS). 
  
2020] ESPORTS 1627 
 
possible thereby preventing other teams from acquiring promis-
ing players.237 What was an inter-league problem became a 
player problem when the control of reserve clauses forced play-
ers to abstain from playing and not be paid for their abstinence. 
In addition, the teams could even prevent a competing league 
from forming if they controlled enough players.238 Until the 
death knell of the reserve clause, the MLB played a game of 
keep-away with the issue, consistently shifting which institution 
should address the issue.239 Nonetheless, even after the death of 
the reserve clause, major leagues continue to exert control over 
the minor leagues, justifying such interference on competitive 
balance premised on avoiding inter-market encroachment.240 
Congress even recognized the validity of this justification by 
providing an antitrust exception to pooled broadcast rights in the 
Sports Broadcasting Act conditioned upon non-interference with 
collegiate athletics.241  
Analogously, in the esports context, leagues, such as the 
League of Legends Championship Series, require organizations 
to field a team of amateur talent—the academy team—in addi-
tion to the professional talent.242 Furthermore, the same pub-
lisher directly interacts with the collegiate scene.243 Rules are 
put in place so that the leagues do not interact or interfere with 
each other.244 The game publisher can successfully control three 
independent markets—collegiate, amateur, and professional—of 
players which feed into each other. Splicing up the levels of play 
brings more players under the game publisher’s control and 
therefore reduces the opportunities for competing leagues to cap-
ture those players and viewers. In addition, Riot operates the 
only true professional League of Legends league, thereby forcing 
 
 237. SURDAM, supra note 153, at 93.  
 238. Id. at 94.  
 239. Id. at 47.  
 240. Cf. Ryan Mabry, Antitrust Law and the Minor League Reserve System, 
6 KALEIDOSCOPE 38, 42–43 (2007) (discussing the Professional Baseball Agree-
ment outlining the intertwined relationship between MLB and the minor 
leagues). 
 241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1293 (2012). 
 242. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing amateur players 
versus professional teams). 
 243. See Reames, supra note 205. 
 244. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
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players to sign to those teams operating in Riot’s publisher-con-
trolled league in order to play at the highest echelon. This posi-
tion as a monopsonist—single buyer for multiple sellers—gives 
the publisher-controlled league immense bargaining power. 
Similar to traditional sports, the publisher can attempt to justify 
the market division and control based on a goodwill attempt to 
avoid inter-market encroachment. 
Additionally, the game publisher controls the supply of play-
ers through license revocations, more commonly referred to as 
bans. Because every player of the game is playing through an 
End User Licensing Agreement subject to the terms of service,245 
the player can be stopped from playing the game publisher at 
any time, for any (or no) reason. Although revoking this license 
is an effective strategy for combatting cheating and other inap-
propriate online conduct, it could also be used to limit the pool of 
players available to play in competing tournaments. And unlike 
in traditional sports, the player could not participate in a com-
peting tournament, or even play for personal enjoyment, and the 
player’s professional career is gone absent a reversal by the pub-
lisher.246  
Take, for example, Blizzard’s ban of Chung “Blitzchung” Ng 
Wai from the Hearthstone Asia-Pacific Grandmasters. After win-
ning a match that was being streamed, Blitzchung expressed 
pro-Hong Kong sentiments.247 Blizzard, likely motivated by its 
dependence on the Chinese market that opposed the ongoing rev-
olution in Hong Kong,248 banned the player from the “highest tier 
 
 245. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 246. However, dedicated esports players have evaded these types of bans in 
the past, but only with extreme effort. See Eric Van Allen, Riot Games Unbans 
Tyler1, A Player it Once Called a ‘Genuine Jerk,’ KOTAKU (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://compete.kotaku.com/riot-games-unbans-tyler1-a-player-it-once-called 
-a-ge-1821785186 [https://perma.cc/9A82-CCNN] (claiming that Tyler1 contin-
ued to play, subject to an ID ban where, if the account was linked to the player, 
it would be banned). But see Matt Perez, Faze Clan Player Permanently Banned 
from ‘Fortnite’ for Cheating, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/mattperez/2019/11/04/faze-clan-player-permanently-banned-from-fort-
nite-for-cheating [https://perma.cc/9VYJ-PN7U]. Even “successful” players in 
this context suffer substantial losses in viewership and therefore revenue. The 
unprofitability in the event of a ban becomes absolute if the player depends on 
a team salary rather than advertising revenue.  
 247. Hearthstone Grandmasters Asia-Pacific Ruling, HEARTHSTONE (Oct. 
10, 2019), https://playhearthstone.com/en-us/blog/23179289 [https://perma.cc/ 
FKG4-75XS]. 
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of Hearthstone Esports” for a year and divested him of all earn-
ings for “engaging in any act that, in Blizzard’s sole discretion, 
brings [the player] into public disrepute, offends a portion or 
group of the public, or otherwise damages Blizzard’s image.”249 
While the ban was ultimately reduced to six months and Bliz-
zard did not opt for the nuclear option of a complete ban from the 
game, blitzchung could no longer compete at the highest tier of 
Hearthstone esports and suffered serious economic conse-
quences. 
One may instinctually push back on the threat of player 
bans based on the number of players in the video game market. 
Millions play the games, but very few people possess the apti-
tude to be a professional esports players; for this reason, they are 
likened to athletes.250 Nevertheless, the extreme costs—particu-
larly social costs—of banning a player, waiting for them to play 
during the ban, and then pursuing legal action to stop their now 
infringement, do disincentivize this behavior. Even so, the game 
publisher can always make an example out of a particular player 
in a competing league to shake investment in its competitors. 
While a naked ban absent any reason would trigger immediate 
scrutiny, the EULA and TOS of the game usually prohibits a 
wide range of conduct that serves as a justification for the revo-
cation—even if one is not needed. The revocation would be justi-
fied under the publisher’s legitimate exercise of its copyright.  
b. Territorial Divisions & Geographic Limitations 
Next, both traditional sports leagues and the Overwatch 
League have experimented with territorial divisions. Limiting 
the number of organizations to one per city and creating local 
monopolies is enticing to sports leagues.251 First, consumers as-
sociate with a local identity; that identity is tapped into by local 
 
BLIZZARD ENTM’T (Oct. 12, 2019), https://news.blizzard.com/en-us/blizzard/ 
23185888/regarding-last-weekend-s-hearthstone-grandmasters-tournament 
[https://perma.cc/7XLG-N6T2] (“The specific views expressed by blitzchung 
were NOT a factor in the decision we made. I want to be clear: our relationships 
in China had no influence on our decision.”). People expressed doubt about this 
statement. E.g., @Slasher, TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://twitter 
.com/Slasher/status/1182815995406225408 [https://perma.cc/B48X-9K8A]. 
 249. Hearthstone Grandmasters Asia-Pacific Ruling, supra note 247. 
 250. Cf. 2018 NA LCS RULES, supra note 171 (requiring a rank of Diamond 
3 or above in ranked solo queue which amounts to less than the top 1% of players 
even eligible to join a team). 
 251. See infra notes 252–57 and accompanying text.  
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teams, and hometown pride drives viewership.252 Placing teams 
strategically can increase viewership efficiently instead of plac-
ing multiple teams in a single locale and only seeing marginal 
increases in an already tapped market. MLB, NFL, and now the 
popular Overwatch League have seen the results of this method 
of branding.253 Second, organizations can begin to develop the 
infrastructure for physical on-site events. Being packed in an en-
ergized stadium with other enthusiasts, feet from the profes-
sional players, is a tried-and-true product in the sports context. 
Similar results are shown in the esports context.254  
These territorial restrictions provided an easy and noticea-
ble restraint on trade to focus on for Congressional representa-
tives seeking to placate constituent demand for a home team in 
the 1950s. At the time, major leagues decided where teams could 
be located; they could not move nor enter the territory of another 
team. The 1951 Congressional hearings, in particular, pressured 
the MLB to expand or relocate towards the Pacific coast.255 The 
committee reported that the territorial restrictions ensured 
teams did not face competition from one another.256 In 1958, the 
NFL defended similar territorial restrictions and the require-
ment of unanimous consent for a team to move into another 
team’s territory under a theory of competitive balance: without 
the protection, teams may encroach upon another in the same 
city.257 Without competition, the organization in charge of the 
event can effectively set supracompetitive ticket prices without 
fear. 
Exclusive licenses to a particular geographic territory are 
common practice in IP licensing deals,258 but the local monopoly 
is often challenged by competing products. Consider the local 
McDonald’s: its franchising agreement may give it the exclusive 
 
 252. Rick Maese, Overwatch League Looks to Future of Esports, as London 
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right to sell Big Macs in your neighborhood, but it still has to 
contend with the Burger King across the street because their 
Whopper is a competing product. In the esports context, most 
consumers only follow a single title (the equivalent of eating ei-
ther Big Macs or Whoppers, but not both) and therefore the local 
monopoly controls the entire set.259 Therefore, without competi-
tion, the consumers wishing to partake in on-site events must 
pay a premium. In the end, providing exclusive licensing ar-
rangements tied to particular localities creates miniature mo-
nopolies for organizations that harm consumer welfare. Not only 
is it a recognized division of the publisher’s copyright, but it can 
be justified on a theory of preventing intraleague encroachment. 
c. Pooled Broadcasting Rights & Public Performance 
The most recent antitrust concern of the traditional sports 
leagues is also central to esports economics: pooled broadcasting 
rights. Pooling the broadcasting rights for sale and limiting sup-
ply of the product through a blackout are both clear types of con-
certed action that reduces competition among the organizations 
in the sale of media rights. The NFL adopted an early rule pro-
hibiting transmission of a member’s games to other markets dur-
ing particular times.260 The court upheld the blackout provision 
for telecasts while the team is at an away game (finding it a rea-
sonable restraint to protect weaker teams from intraleague com-
petition) but found the restraints on telecasts otherwise illegal 
under a rule of reason analysis.261 Lobbyists rushed to Congress 
for further expansion for broadcast rights—namely an antitrust 
exception for broadcast rights.262 Born from the lobbyists’ efforts 
was the Sports Broadcasting Act.263 The Act exempts contracts 
for pooled broadcasting rights for leagues participating in foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, and hockey so long as the broadcasting 
does not interfere with collegiate and interscholastic athletics.264 
However, the Sports Broadcasting Act specifically enumer-
ates the exempted sports; esports is naturally not among 
 
 259. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 260. Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports 
Telecasts, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 501, 511 (2014). 
 261. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 326–27 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
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them.265 Furthermore, the Sports Broadcasting Act only deals 
with commercially-sponsored telecasts rather than the sale of 
the rights to subscription services.266 Nevertheless, esports 
leagues have entered into exclusive broadcasting agreements 
with particular online streaming platforms, possibly in violation 
of antitrust law’s prohibition on concerted action.267 Esports 
leagues walk a tight line when exclusively licensing to a partic-
ular online media platform.268  
The league does not have the same antitrust exception or 
competitive justification of protecting weaker teams. Should a 
competing streaming service attempt to challenge the grouped 
package, the publisher-controlled league will likely argue that 
the “grouped package” is in fact the sale of a license of its public 
performance rights rather than that of the league. Under Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the pub-
lisher could say that the licensing is “reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the [copy]rights that are granted.”269 In the end, the 
game publisher who controls the league retains the rights to 
public performance and may authorize anyone or no one to cre-
ate such copies of the video game content.270 Instead of being 
characterized as concerted action among the teams and the 
league, the “pooling” arrangements may in fact be a sale of public 
performance rights of the independent publisher. With this legal 
uncertainty, channelers are left to pay a supracompetitive price 
or the price of litigation.  
d. Complete Takedown & Exclusivity 
Finally, returning to the EVO example,271 current practice 
suggests that the game publisher can shut down any tournament 
 
 265. Id.  
 266. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 267. E.g., Jacob Wolf, Overwatch League To Be Streamed on Twitch.tv in 
Two-Year, $90 Million Deal, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.espn.com/ 
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-million-deal [https://perma.cc/AN4M-BUW3] (reporting the deal between Ac-
tivision-Blizzard and Twitch). 
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19 (1979). 
 270. See supra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text.  
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that is operating without a license.272 When the game publisher 
controls a league, there is an enormous benefit of exercising the 
monopoly over the intellectual property and taking control of all 
possible revenue. The publisher can simply refuse to deal and is 
justified by the legitimate monopoly over its copyright. While 
this benefit does not likely outweigh the alternatives of licensing 
fees obtained from tournament revenues and exposure to a 
larger audience,273 the risk nevertheless remains that the tour-
nament’s broadcast could be entirely shut down with a simple 
DMCA takedown notice of infringement and the tournament it-
self via a strongly-worded letter implying an incoming law suit 
for infringement.274  
In the end, despite a number of concerning practices possi-
bly restraining trade or maintaining monopolization, publisher-
controlled leagues have a number of justifications based in 
sports antitrust jurisprudence and copyright law that may insu-
late the leagues from scrutiny. Table 1 summarizes these prob-
lematic practices and their justifications. Under these compli-
mentary theories of competitive balance and copyright, 
publisher-controlled leagues will be able to maintain the market 
of self-regulation favoring deep control over the esports market 
by the publisher.  
  
 
 272. See supra notes 13–28 and accompanying text.  
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Table 1: Summary of Practices 
C. PROBLEMS WITH LEAVING THE STATUS QUO  
In the face of these practices, the esports industry neverthe-
less clamors for self-regulation, and one option is to leave the 
status quo as is. On its face, it would appear that independent 
tournament organizers are not suffering too poorly when over a 
thousand tournaments occur each year.275 Furthermore, there 
are very few instances of copyright abuse and publisher refusals 
to license their game. In fact, self-regulation has been incredibly 
beneficial to the esports industry whose growth has only accel-
erated in recent years.276 
But this view of the industry is misleading and the risk of 
copyright abuse to engage in anticompetitive practices is too 
high to consider this to be a reasonable option. First, this view 
ignores the top-heavy structure of tournament prize pools that 
place the only economically-viable positions for professional 
 
 275. Christopher Ingraham, The Massive Popularity of Esports, in Charts, 
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players in the publisher’s hands.277 Second, the game publisher 
made a significant investment into developing an esports title, 
perhaps with the very intention of monetizing competitive 
play.278 The copyright system rewards that investment by giving 
the publisher exclusivity rights over the intellectual property. If 
history has anything to say, self-regulation will eventually break 
down. Sports leagues eventually entered into dispute over player 
salaries and congresspeople faced public pressure to bring 
change.279 When the courts were asked to make the decisions, 
they deferred to Congress280 or found the issues moot once league 
lobbyists went to Congress.281 In the end, courts looked to Con-
gress and Congress has either failed to understand the unique 
economics of sports leagues, failed to act, or succumbed to uni-
lateral lobbying pressure.282 Intellectual property flowing from 
technology in esports concerns would only aggravate the prob-
lem. As investment in esports continues to increase,283 game 
publishers may be seduced by copyright exclusivity and begin 
enforcing the monopoly over their title with little to no hope for 
effective intervention by the courts or Congress. 
III.  ESPORTS COMPETITION MODERNIZATION ACT: 
COMPULSORY LICENSING AND COMPETING 
COMPETITIONS   
We would be happy with anything that would keep us out of the courts 
and spell out the things that we have to have.  
—Bert Bell, NFL Commissioner284 
This final Part presents a solution based on the Music Mod-
ernization Act’s collective licensing management organization 
 
 277. Will Partin, The International Is Bad for Dota 2, KOTAKU (July 31, 
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and applies it to licensing within the esports industry. The es-
ports industry must come together to Congress to propose a 
trade-off: compulsory licensing for guaranteed compensation 
and competition.285 The Music Modernization Act (MMA) serves 
as roadmap for finding effective solutions to industries reliant on 
licensing and self-regulation. Beginning with a discussion of mu-
sic as an imperfect model for compulsory licensing and rate set-
ting, this Note ultimately aspires to set forth what the esports 
industry needs in order to stay out of the courts.  
A. MUSIC AS A MODEL: ONLINE MUSIC STREAMING SERVICES & 
COMPULSORY LICENSING  
In a market equally dependent upon self-regulation, innova-
tion, and copyright, the music industry revisited the pooled li-
censing and royalty collection problem in 2018. Songwriters 
were not collecting royalties for the mechanical licenses when 
sites such as Spotify and Apple Music streamed their work.286 
Those platforms faced legal uncertainty in terms of possible in-
fringement of the songwriter and artist copyrights over the 
songs.287 But music fans continued to demand such services 
without an effective and efficient means for those platforms to 
obtain the appropriate licensure. Like the Spotify situation, cur-
rent streamers, professional esports players, and tournaments 
currently take an infringe-now-defend-later approach.288 
The bipartisan Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Mod-
ernization Act of 2018 signaled a cease-fire to the war over the 
licensing of music.289 The bill set forth a compulsory blanket li-
censing system managed by independent non-profit collective 
 
 285. This Note is not the first to recommend the compulsory licensing sys-
tem. Yang Qiu suggested that a compulsory license may be used to settle the 
debate over copyright ownership in streaming under Chinese law. Yang Qiu, A 
Cure for Twitch: Compulsory License Promoting Vide Game Live-Streaming, 21 
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management organization and a rate-setting board.290 The goal 
was to create a more streamlined way to ensure music creators 
collected royalties due from streaming sites.291 In effect, through 
the system, music streaming services can play the music first, 
then pay a statutorily-set fee per listen or a percentage of the 
revenue, whichever is greater.292 In addition, the bill made sev-
eral reforms to copyright law and provided a safe harbor for dig-
ital music services that reserved a sum of money for uncollected 
royalties.293 The effects of the Act have not yet been seen, but the 
industry has exhibited immense support and have faith in the 
solution.294 While music publishers could not come together as 
horizontal competitors to pool together licenses to offer to digital 
service providers like Spotify, they came to Congress with the 
genuine desire to solve the problem and created a statutory so-
lution to music licensure. Now, digital service providers have ac-
cess to millions of songs and content creators are guaranteed roy-
alty payments through a third-party organization. 
Unfortunately, the current cooperative atmosphere sur-
rounding the MMA masks a more acrimonious debate over rate-
setting that this solution necessarily implicates. In the end, dig-
ital streaming service providers want to pay as little as possible 
for the license, and composers, publishers, Performance Rights 
Organizations, and performers all want as much money as they 
can get. Rate-setting litigation is contentious295 and the proposed 
Esports Competition Modernization Act will necessarily import 
this feature. Imperfect as it may be, the MMA, as will be shown, 
is the most effective and least-invasive means of stopping poten-
tial copyright abuses in violation of antitrust laws.  
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 291. Id.  
 292. Jeong, supra note 114. 
 293. Issues and Policy: Music Modernization Act, supra note 286; Wang, su-
pra note 290. 
 294. Davis, supra note 289 (listing support of the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America, the National Music Publishers Association, and the National 
Association of Broadcasters among others). 
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B. STATUTORY SOLUTION: ESPORTS COMPETITION 
MODERNIZATION ACT 
While this Note does not seek to write the entirety of an in-
credibly complex Congressional bill, it will develop a skeleton of 
the absolute needs for the esports industry in order for the act to 
be a success. These include (1) involvement of the industry, (2) 
an opt-in system, (3) the non-exclusive rights, (4) compensation, 
and (5) notice tied to (6) withdrawal rights.  
The first of these needs is the participation of the entire es-
ports industry. The esports industry, like music and traditional 
sports before it, has existed through self-regulation. When Con-
gress and regulators tried to impose their will upon traditional 
sports, sports pushed back and used tactics to delay any signifi-
cant changes to the industry.296 It is already a common refrain 
that esports is unique and regulators would likely fail to consider 
the specialized nature of the industry.297 To eliminate industry 
pushback, the industry itself must be involved in the process. 
The unique market must identify a unique solution. Organized 
esports competitions cannot be addressed in tandem with other 
intellectual property issues without running the risk of doing 
more harm than good by introducing new concepts or overex-
tending existing ones. The unique solution found by the music 
industry—a streamlined compulsory licensing system—best 
serves to solve the problem of publisher-controlled leagues and 
downstream control without trampling over successful self-reg-
ulation.  
Next, the industry needs to separate the wheat from the 
chaff, the esports titles from the average video game. Under this 
proposed Esports Competition Modernization Act, publishers 
would choose to opt-in to the compulsory licensing system. Pub-
lisher-organized competitive play would only be allowed upon 
opting-in. This selection could occur upon registration of the 
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game with the Copyright Office. This system recognizes that con-
trol over the intellectual property remains with the publisher. 
Because the publisher can choose when and whether to monetize 
the competitive scene, publishers remain incentivized to develop 
esports games without affecting non-esports titles.298 But, when 
the publisher chooses to monetize the downstream esports mar-
ket by forming a league, the publisher must do so on relative 
equal footing with all other organizations wishing to organize 
competitive playing of video games. The act cuts off downstream 
control without making the publisher forfeit their copyright ab-
solutely.  
The core of the act would revolve around the rights of tour-
nament operators—regardless of whether that tournament op-
erator is the publisher or independent. The scope of the license 
and conditions for obtaining one could be outlined using lan-
guage from existing tournament licenses: 
Section 1. Compulsory License to Tournament Operator — A person 
complying with the provisions of this section may obtain a non-exclu-
sive, non-transferable, limited, royalty-bearing license (“License”) to 
use and display the software title[s] identified by you in the signup 
form (the “Game(s)”) for inclusion in the Tournament. The License 
shall include the following activities: (a) operate and use the Game(s) 
during the Tournament; (b) publicly display and publicly perform the 
Game(s) during the Tournament in a live Tournament venue; (c) live 
online transmission or broadcast of the Tournament via web-based 
video streaming services; (d) record all Tournament games, and dis-
tribute and sublicense such recording for later private linear viewing 
via web-based video streaming services; and (e) promote the use of the 
Game(s) in connection with the Tournament.299 
Each word in this grant is important. It must be non-exclu-
sive so as to promote competitions among tournament operators. 
The license must be non-transferable to prevent free-riders from 
not complying with the other conditions set forth in the act. It is 
limited to tournament play and the broadcast thereof; it does not 
extend to the game itself. To be exact, it gives all of the rights to 
operate and monetize a tournament, but nothing more. 
 
 298. Note too that this trade-off necessarily means that the proposed act is 
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With the tournament operators happy with the license 
scope, game publishers must also be happy with the royalty rate. 
Independent tournament operators could agree to a royalty ar-
rangement to obtain a compulsory license for any number of es-
ports titles through a rate-setting board.300 One means of calcu-
lating the royalty would be a percentage of the revenue from  
the tournament or a set amount per view and attendee. This  
“Spotifyication” of esports would adequately compensate the 
publisher for its possible lost revenue that would be gained 
through enforcement of its copyright exclusivity. Outside of the 
collection of royalties and the adjudication of disputes related 
thereto, the board should not have any oversight capacity. Again, 
this balances the need to establish a rate with the industry’s de-
sire to remain in control. Who better to determine the rate for 
such a license than the industry itself?  
There will also need to be a trade-off of notice requirements 
for tournament reservations and opting-out. First, the tourna-
ment operator must notify the game publisher 180 days before 
the tournament is set to take place. Notice should include the 
identity of the tournament operator, the dates of the tournament 
or league (which may last no longer than one year), the antici-
pated number of competitors, and a general description of the 
event. This notice would secure the license for a set tournament, 
which would need to be renewed for each subsequent tourna-
ment. Second, the publisher must give 180 days-notice before 
withdrawing a game from the compulsory licensing scheme. The 
decision to allow for retraction is likely controversial. After all, 
one of the greatest worries is that tournament operators will 
have invested significant resources into a tournament when the 
game publisher can take it all away. But withdrawal is neces-
sary under the U.S. copyright system that recognizes the inher-
ent right of the author over one’s work. The copyright owner 
should never permanently lose control over the work until it en-
ters the public domain.301  
 
 300. The creation of a rate-setting board prompts the question of whether it 
would be necessary for the tournament operators to then create a collective 
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In the end, the Esports Competition Modernization Act 
would allow industry participants to secure the stability it has 
so desperately sought since its inception in the 1970s by elimi-
nating risk of infringement and enforcement by the publisher. 
Courts and Congress have yet to adequately lay out the protec-
tions inherent in video games and the limitations to those pro-
tections, e.g., fair use in the video game and esports context. In 
a compulsory licensing schema, the licensee would pay for the 
rights—regardless of what the courts ultimately decide about 
those rights—and be free from worry of disruption by the pub-
lisher. Giving stability to the tournaments would incentivize ad-
ditional investment. Sponsors would no longer worry about a ti-
tle being pulled from a tournament or a league and its teams 
ceasing to exist. In turn, tournament operators would pass on 
the benefits of increased investment to the consumers. Players, 
too, would have more certainty and job security in independent 
leagues: licensees would compete for teams who would compete 
for players and, in turn, salaries would become competitive.  
This effectively implements the interleague competition of 
competing competitions critique. Publishers can run a league so 
long it gives up the right to exclude competition. More than a 
single championship will take place as each league is independ-
ent of the others. Consumers would then choose to support any 
tournament to spectate instead of only having the publisher-con-
trolled league. It does not, however, inherently imply the intra-
league open-architecture structure. A league does not need a rel-
egation system under this compulsory license. The teams could 
be “permanent” within a league, as they are with ones today. But 
leagues would compete with each other for players. If a league 
fails to perform, players could switch into a more beneficial 
league, possibly dragging along consumer interest. This creates 
a hybrid model of competing competitions that emphasizes com-
petition among tournaments and leagues.  
As for the anticompetitive conduct discussed, most of the is-
sues are avoided under the Esports Competition Modernization 
 
the license and that the right of cancellation is necessary to create balance). 
With the introduction of a withdrawal mechanic, the act introduces an element 
of gamesmanship. For instance, if the publisher and a tournament operator 
launch leagues at the same time and the independent operator is more success-
ful immediately, the publisher is incentivized to withdraw its title, wait until 
the public has forgotten, and opt back in when the publisher is more prepared. 
Time limits to opting back in after opting out can deter this behavior.  
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Act. Players could not be banned from playing in a competing 
league so long as they operate within the scope of the compulsory 
license. Due to the increase in demand for players, leagues will 
compete with each other by providing the least restrictive league 
bylaws. Territorial monopolies are impossible to grant because 
another league represents competition within the territory. 
Pooled broadcasting rights no longer fall solely within the hands 
of the publisher, but in the hands of all licensees. Finally, the 
compulsory license removes the publisher’s ability to pull a title 
at the last minute. While it should be allowed for the publisher 
to revoke its acceptance of the compulsory licensing guidelines, 
only future licenses should be affected. 
C. COMPETING SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLISHER-CONTROLLED 
LEAGUES: GOVERNANCE, COPYRIGHT, AND ANTITRUST 
Academics have discussed three alternative solutions to ad-
dressing the anticompetitive effects of intellectual property li-
censing by publisher-controlled leagues: leave regulation of the 
industry to an independent governance body, modify copyright 
of video games to limit publisher control, and leave parties to 
test antitrust concerns in the courts. Each solution has critical 
flaws that render it ineffective in tackling the entire problem of 
downstream control by publisher-controlled leagues.  
Laura Chao proposed a regulatory and governance body to 
provide oversight of esports.302 Recognizing the legitimate paral-
lels between sports and esports economics, Chao argued that an 
independent pan-esports governing body should be used to set 
minimum standards for consumers, players, teams, and 
leagues.303 She also rightfully pointed out that such an inde-
pendent agency could facilitate the negotiation and sale of con-
tent distribution agreements.304 But, her solution does not en-
gage with the intricacies of copyright licensing. Governance 
would have a chilling effect but would not prevent the publisher 
from banning players in competing leagues, granting territorial 
exclusivity to particular teams, licensing exclusive content to a 
particular distributor, or refusing to license to competing tour-
nament operators. Furthermore, said governing body could be 
 
 302. Chao, supra note 8, at 761. 
 303. Id. at 761–63.  
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subject to regulatory capture. Given that the publishers cur-
rently have the largest economic weight to throw, the govern-
ance body will end up a rubber stamp for publisher-benefitting 
practices.305 Finally, a pan-esports governing body is in direct 
contrast with the industry’s preference for publisher-regulation 
of its titles and self-regulation as a whole: governance from 
above is not palatable. 
If not governance, many have suggested that the root of the 
issue is the ambiguity of copyright protections afforded to rights 
holders over video games, and that statutory or judicial interpre-
tation placing limits on those rights could rectify the problem. 
The reform would take place through the arguments previously 
discussed: interactivity creating independent copyright, trans-
formative fair use, and copyright misuse.306 Harttung307 and Ha-
gen308 believe that fair use provides the most likely solution for 
online broadcasts of video games in particular. The fair use ar-
gument has gained the most traction, but it would be the equiv-
alent of hammering in a screw. Modifying an already tortured 
doctrine permitting quite a bit of user-generated content to fit 
the unique situation of esports would likely do more harm than 
good. Furthermore, placing reliance on defensive measures still 
leaves putative infringers on the hook for the risks of litigation. 
Finally, finding fair use for online broadcast of video games 
would disincentivize publishers from creating additional esports 
titles. This runs contrary to copyright’s constitutional goal of 
promoting innovation.  
Finally, Miroff argues that antitrust law already provides 
an adequate vehicle for limiting anticompetitive conduct by pub-
lisher-controlled leagues.309 In his article, he outlines a tying 
claim against a publisher-controlled league for its misuse of cop-
yright in the downstream esports markets.310 While it is true 
that antitrust law provides an effective means of finding limits 
to copyright licensing arrangements by publisher-controlled 
leagues, his failure to engage with sports antitrust history limits 
 
 305. See Miroff, supra note 8, at 220 (claiming that Chao’s solution would 
only aggravate anticompetitive practices).  
 306. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 307. Harttung, supra note 11.  
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 310. Id. at 210–12.  
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its applicability. The culture of self-regulation and industry 
pushback adopted from traditional sports will effectively delay 
applicability of antitrust until the economic practices become en-
trenched. Worst of all, the monitoring costs of his solution fall on 
the smaller stakeholders within the esports market: the inde-
pendent tournament operators. Bearing the costs of suit is not in 
the short-term interest of these organizations, particularly so 
long as the publishers act benevolently.  
What has not been discussed is the possibility of taking a 
play from the music industry’s playbook. Music, like esports, is 
an industry dependent on copyright licensing and self-regula-
tion. Consumer demand for esports content continues to climb, 
thereby incentivizing quick capitalization by entrepreneurs.311 
Like the music industry did to find a statutory solution to the 
mass licensing of digital media, all of the various esports partic-
ipants must come to Congress and self-regulate one final time. 
The process of the Music Modernization Act and the solution of 
compulsory licensing effectively takes ideas native to the sports 
and intellectual property arenas to create an esports regime that 
satisfies antitrust concerns through competing competitions. 
Critics of this solution would rightfully point out that the 
Music Modernization Act is a risky basis for problem-solving. 
when the effects of the streamlined system have yet to be seen. 
There are numerous distinctions between the music and video 
game industries that may caution against such an import. Im-
portantly, esports do not face the numbers problem that music 
faces and that necessitated the compulsory licensing solution: it 
is still economically feasible for a tournament operator to con-
tract with every publisher.312 The solution is not perfect: just like 
sports antitrust does not map perfectly onto the esports issues, 
music does not do so either. In the end, although the compulsory 
licensing system may not be justified by the sheer number of ac-
tors, like in music, it can be justified on the need to address an-
titrust concerns laid down in this Note. And while the specific 
 
 311. Pannekeet, supra note 3. 
 312. This is distinguishable from the concerns raised by Allen, supra note 
102, at 227–28, about the impracticality of the publisher contracting with all 
streamers. The number of independent tournament operators are necessarily 
fewer than the number of streamers. 
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effects of the Music Modernization Act have yet to be seen, com-
pulsory licensing in music and rate-setting has a longer history 
that justifies their use. 
Additionally, critics of the proposed Esports Competition 
Modernization Act can claim that publishers will still come up 
with invidious ways to maintain control over the league.313 True, 
the game publisher has unique access to the game, its client, and 
its balance system. But, the crux of the proposed act is to put the 
independent tournament operator and publisher tournament op-
erator on a more level playing field with regards to the mere abil-
ity to organize play. The publisher could not introduce new func-
tions or characters in the game without giving access to 
licensees.314 The publisher could not force others to play on older 
versions of the game without subjecting itself to the same limi-
tations. The only advantage left becomes advance knowledge of 
game balance and changes, which should not impact the heart of 
competing competitions.  
In the end, an Esports Competition Modernization Act could 
be developed by industry participants in order to address the 
risk from legal ambiguity and downstream publisher control. 
Drawing from a solution prevalent in both sports antitrust and 
copyright domains, the proposed act would create a compulsory 
licensing system that negates the publisher’s ability to monopo-
lize a title while compensating the entity for its loss. At the same 
time, the proposed act would also reinforce the stability of the 
industry by allowing independent tournaments to thrive, creat-
 
 313. The author would like to thank Ross Abbott for discussing means of 
imposing disadvantage on independent tournament operators.  
 314. There is, however, an unresolved question as to whether the act should 
go beyond the gameplay protected by copyright and extend to the means of view-
ing the gameplay, which could be protected under patent law. See supra note 73 
and accompanying text. If it does not extend that far, this may lead to a reverse-
engineering question similar to the one presented in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding fair use of re-
verse-engineering of Sega game to make Sega-compatible games) and Sony 
Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 610 (9th Cir.) (find-
ing fair use of reverse-engineering Sony games to make a computer-compatible 
version to compete against the PlayStation), cert denied 531 U.S. 871 (2000), if 
the independent tournament operator must disassemble the game to determine 
how it can spectate matches. To the extent that the finished product incorpo-
rates copyrightable elements of the game, the compulsory license should shield 
against claims of infringement. 
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ing competition for professional players, and giving the basic cer-
tainty that the industry is not reliant upon a single benevolent 
overlord: the publisher. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Note highlighted the danger of publisher-controlled es-
ports leagues and downstream control by illustrating how copy-
right licensing can lead to historically-recognized sports anti-
trust issues. Coupling copyright considerations and antitrust 
arguments effectively outlines the strong justifications publish-
ers can use to maintain the status quo in their favor. After con-
sidering the impact of player restrictions, territorial divisions, 
pooled broadcasting rights, and publisher exclusivity, this Note 
recommends adopting a compulsory licensing system based on 
the Music Modernization Act. The solution would cut off the pub-
lisher’s downstream control in the industry while compensating 
it for such loss. This solution is less invasive than an oversight 
committee, more targeted than statutory amendments to copy-
right law, and more reliable than leaving it to the courts to dis-
cuss the complex antitrust considerations.  
Esports will lead to a reconsideration of decades of precedent 
and practice. Whether it be in antitrust law, copyright law, or 
other fields, it will be necessary to determine if esports is en-
lightening or aberrational in the view of the law. This Note used 
publisher-controlled leagues to shine light on potential anticom-
petitive conduct through copyright licensing, but the greater im-
plication is a reconsideration of the current antitrust exemptions 
and excuses for traditional sports. Sports slipped into exceptions 
as it matured into the national pastime. As esports continue to 
mature, the questions remain: is it time for regulation and when 
is it too late? 
 
